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COMMENTS 
lniplement~tion of the Bank Holding Company Act 
Amendments of 1970: The Scope of 
Ranking Activities 
There has been a continuing conflict between those who wish to 
allow banks to diversify their operations beyond the traditionally 
limited scope of the banking business and those who see such an 
expansion as a threat to the stability of the economy and a license for 
unfair competition.1 The most recent in a continuing series of at-
tempts to reconcile this conflict is found in the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act Amendments of 19702 and the implementation of these 
Amendments by the Federal Reserve Board. The original Act, 
adopted in 1956,8 was the first major attempt4 to bring bank holding 
companies, a device that had been used by banks to diversify into 
nonbank activities, 5 under regulatory restraints. The original Act 
I. See Hearings on H.R. 6778 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 
91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 2 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 House Hearings] (opening state• 
ment of Chairman Patman); S. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1970) [hereinafter 
1970 SENATE REPORT]; s. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1955); M. NADLER &: 
J. BoGAN, THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY 11-12 (1959); Chase, The Emerging Financial 
Conglomerate: Liberalization of the Bank Holding Company Act, 60 GEo. L.J. 1225, 
1225-26 (1972). 
2. Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50, 1971-78 (1970)). 
There were two main forces that urged adoption of the 1970 amendments. One 
group, headed by the Nixon Administration, was primarily concerned that the one-
bank holding company movement might lead to the formation of huge industrial-
commercial-financial conglomerates. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1052, S. 1211, S. 1664, 
S. 3823, and H.R. 6778 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 
2d Sess. 7-11 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Senate Hearings] (statement of Undersecretary of 
the Treasury Charis Walker). Businesses that found themselves in competition with 
affiliates of bank holding companies also wanted to limit the scope of bank holding 
company activity. See, e.g., 1970 Senate Hearings, supra, at 461, 481 (insurance com-
panies), 509, 534 (data processing companies), 276, 322, 412 (travel agencies). The 
main opponents of the amendments were banking organizations that took an active 
role in attempts to protect their interests. See, e.g., 1969 House Hearings, supra note I, 
at 900, 1029 (large bank holding companies), 1097 (regulated multibank holding com-
panies), 1176 (small banking organizations). 
3. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133, as amended, Act of 
July I, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, 80 Stat. 236, as amended, Bank Holding Company 
Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No, 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760. 
4. The Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 
12 U.S.C.), imposed limited control on bank holding companies. Controls were ap-
plicable when two conditions were met: (1) at least one of the banks in the holding 
company system was a member of the Federal Reserve System, and (2) the holding 
company desired to vote its bank stock. Under these circumstances, the company was 
required to seek a voting permit from the Federal Reserve Board and to submit itself 
and its subsidiaries to examination by the Board. Ch. 89, § 19, 48 Stat. 186. 
Due to the essentially voluntary nature of the second requirement, most bank 
holding companies were able to avoid regulation. As of 1955, only eighteen companies 
had submitted to federal regulation. See S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955). 
5. Chase, supra note I, at 1226-27. 
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covered only those holding companies that controlled at least two 
banks. The changes made by the 1970 amendments6 included extend-
ing the coverage of the Act to include companies that control only 
one bank7 and modifying the standards used to determine which 
nonbanking activities bank holding companies will be permitted to 
carry on.8 
In the two years since the amendments were enacted, the Federal 
Reserve Board has indicated the course that it will follow in imple-
menting the provisions relating to nonbanking activities. This Com-
ment will survey that course and evaluate it in the light of the intent 
of Congress in enacting the 1970 amendments. 
I. BACKGROUND TO THE ADOPTION OF THE 1970 .AMENDMENTS 
The intended impact of the amendments can best be understood 
in terms of the efforts that have been made by banks to expand into 
nonbanking activities, for holding companies have been extensively 
used to circumvent the strict limitations on such expansion. 9 In their 
operations banks have been restricted to the powers granted in their 
charters and in the statutes under which they are organized.10 The 
powers of national banks are exclusively granted by the federal bank-
ing laws.11 Title twelve of the United States Code expressly autho-
rizes certain powers. For example, national banks can carry on tradi-
tional banking functions "by discounting and negotiating promissory 
notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt; by re-
ceiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and bullion; 
by loaning money on personal security .... "12 Other grants of powers 
6. In addition to the changes discussed in this Comment, the 1970 amendments 
modified several definitions, excluded certain classes of companies from regulation as 
bank holding companies, exempted various types of shares from the prohibitions on 
holding of nonbank stock, modified regulatory procedures, and required all banks 
affiliated with holding companies to become members of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. For a concise summary of the changes made by the amendments, see 1970 
SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 23-27. 
7. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § lOl(a), 
84 Stat. 1760, amending Bank Holding Company Act § 2(a)(l) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 184l(a)(l) (1970)). 
8. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 103, 
84 Stat. 1763, amending Bank Holding Company Act § 4 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843 
(1970)). 
9. Chase, supra note 1, at 1227. 
10. See generally 4 MICIIlE ON BANKS AND BANKING ch. 7, § 1 (rev. ed. 1971) (state 
banks); 7A id. ch. 15, § 154 (rev. ed. 1973) (national banks). 
11. "The measure of their powers is the statutory grant; and powers not conferred 
by Congress are denied. For the Act under which national banks are organized con-
stitutes a complete system for their government •••• " Texas &: Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245, 253 (1934). See also Logan County Natl. Bank v. Townsend, 139 
U.S. 67, 73 (1891); California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362, 366 (1897). 
12. 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh (1970). 
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are restricted to particular purposes,13 or are subject to conditions14 
or quantitative limitations.15 Certain powers, such as the power to act 
in fiduciary capacities16 or to contribute to charitable organizations,17 
are contingent upon the powers of state institutions in the state of 
the bank's operations. 
In addition to expressly granted powers, national banks are 
authorized to exercise "[a]ll such incidental powers as shall be 
necessary to carry on the business of banking .... "18 Once an under-
taking has been found to be an approved incidental activity, the 
bank is allowed considerable discretion in exercising the power; the 
courts have ruled that the bank may behave as any prudent business-
man would under the circumstances.19 However, the exercise of the 
incidental power must at all times be focused upon the authorized 
banking objective. Thus, while a bank may be permitted to operate 
a business in order to facilitate its sale as a going concern, if it at-
tempts to operate the business in hopes of realizing profits, it exceeds 
its power.20 
The limits on state banks are more difficult to describe since each 
state's approach is somewhat different. Unless a federal statute ex-
13. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1970) (restrictions on real property ownership). 
14. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh (1970) (approval of Comptroller of the Currency 
required before national banks allowed to purchase investment securities for own 
account). 
15. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1970) (maximum allowable levels of loans to any one 
borrower). 
16. 12 U.S.C. § 92a (1970). 
17. 12 U.S.C. § 24 Eighth (1970). 
18. 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh (1970). Incidental activity must facilitate the perfor-
mance of an authorized power to qualify as an incidental power. See, e.g., Franklin 
Natl. Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373 (1954) (advertisement of authorized services); First 
Natl. Bank v. National Exch. Bank, 92 U.S. 122 (1876) (acceptance of stock in settle-
ment of debts); Atherton v. Anderson, 86 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1936), revd. on other 
grounds, 302 U.S. 643 (1937) (operation of business to facilitate sale as going concern 
in order to recover loans); Brown v. Schleier, 118 F. 981 (8th Cir. 1902), afjd., 194 U.S. 
18 (1904) (rental of excess space in bank office building); Cockrill v. Abeles, 86 F. 505 
(8th Cir. 1898) (purchase of outstanding interests in property acquired in settlement 
of a debt). It is not sufficient that the allegedly incidental activity is similar to per-
mitted banking functions, First Natl. Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 659 (1924) (opera-
tion of branch banks), or can be conveniently performed by a bank. Arnold Tours, 
Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 438 (1st Cir. 1972) (operation of travel agency); Saxon v. 
Georgia Assn. of Indep. Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968) (sale of credit-
related insurance). See generally Beatty, What Are the Legal Limits to the Expansion 
of National Bank Services?, 86 BANKING L.J. 3 (1969) [hereinafter Beatty, Legal Limits 
of Bank Services]; Beatty, The Incidental Powers of National Banks, 4 NATL. BANKING 
R.Ev. 263 (1967); Huck, What Is the Banking Business?, 83 BANKING L.J. 491 (1966). 
19. First Natl. Bank v. National Exch. Bank, 92 U.S. 122, 127 (1876). Accord, Brown 
v. Schleier, 118 F. 981 (8th Cir. 1902), affd., 194 U.S. 18 (1904); Cooper v. Hill, 94 F. 
582 (8th Cir. 1899). 
20. Atherton v. Anderson, 86 F.2d 518, 525-26 (6th Cir. 1936), revd. on other grounds, 
302 U.S. 643 (1937). 
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plicitly restricts state bank activity,21 state laws and charters granted 
by the state define the powers of these institutions.22 No federal law 
makes the incidental powers clause of the National Banking Act 
applicable to state banks. However, a number of states have adopted 
similar clauses,23 which must be applied to the particular powers 
explicitly granted by those states. Moreover, some states grant powers 
denied to national banks. The New York and Ohio statutes, for 
example, permit travel agency operations,24 and Indiana permits 
leasing of real property25 and some insurance agency operations.26 
These grants, both federal and state, exclude almost all commer-
cial and industrial activities available to other enterprises, including 
many highly profitable activities. During the 1960's, two major 
efforts were made to expand the scope of permissible bank activities. 
First, the Comptroller of the Currency, James J. Saxon, reversed the 
long-standing policy of the Comptroller's office27 and issued rulings 
expanding the permissible scope of national bank activities. He took 
a flexible view of the limitations imposed by the national banking 
laws: "The National Banking Act is not a merchandise mail-order 
catalog. It is rather, like the Constitution of the United States, a 
framework under which National Banks may employ their inventive-
ness and capacity for change to respond to the needs of our growing 
industry and commerce, both domestic and international."28 
Among the activities that the Comptroller interpreted as within 
the scope of national bank powers were selling data processing ser-
vices, 29 leasing personal property acquired at the specific request of 
and for the use of a customer,30 operating travel agencies,31 acting as 
21. The most important federal restrictions placed upon state banks are conditions 
of membership in the Federal Reserve System. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1970) (state banks 
subject to same limitation on ownership of investment securities as national banks). 
22. "It is a prevailing rule, in Ohio and elsewhere, that banks and trust companies, 
though organized primarily for private profit, are of a preeminently public nature and 
have only such powers as are expressly conferred on them by their charters and by 
statute, or such as may fairly be implied from those expressly given." Ulmer v. Fulton, 
129 Ohio St. 323, 332, 195 N.E. 557, 561 (1935) (emphasis original). See also People v. 
Cairo-Alexander Bank, 363 Ill. 589, 2 N.E.2d 889 (1936): 4 MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANK-
ING ch. 7, §§ 1, 5 (rev. ed. 1971). 
23. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-57(a) (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 48.15 (1970). 
24. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 96(13) (McKinney 1971): OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § II07.31 
(Page 1968). 
25. IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-II03(7) (Supp. 1972). 
26. IND. ANN. STAT, § 18-ll02 (1964). 
27. Beatty, Legal Limits of Bank Services, supra note 18, at 20-22. 
28. 1964 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURIU:NCY ANN. REP. 248. 
29. 12 C.F.R. § 7.3500 (1973). 
30. 12 C.F.R. § 7.3400 (1973). 
31. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7475 (1973). 
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agent in the sale of credit-related insurance,32 operating messenger 
services,33 providing tax preparation services,34 underwriting revenue 
bonds of state and local govemments,35 and operating commingled 
investment funds.36 The Comptroller further concluded that the 
restrictions on stock ownership found in the National Banking Act37 
did not prevent a bank from carrying on any activities through sub-
sidiaries that the bank could have performed itself.88 
This expansion in the permissible scope of the activities of 
national banks39 put great pressure on their state bank competitors, 
who in tum urged state regulatory agencies and legislators to make 
similarly expansive modifications in the state regulatory systems. 
Several very large state banks converted to national bank status to 
take advantage of these expanded powers.40 A number of states re-
sponded by amending their banking laws to permit state banks to 
carry on activities within the new national powers. Some states enu-
merated newly granted powers;41 others used incidental powers 
clauses to achieve a similar result, with several explicitly tying the 
incidental powers to those allowed national banks under federal 
law.42 
However, in 1966, the expansive trend under the Comptroller's 
rulings began to suffer severe setbacks in the courts. In that year the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia struck 
down the Comptroller's interpretation allowing national banks 
to underwrite revenue bonds.43 Later suits invalidated the rulings 
with regard to the sale of insurance incident to banking transac-
_ 32. U.S. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, COMPTROLLER'S 
MANUAL FOR NATIONAL BANKS 1J 7110 (1963). 
33. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7490 (1973). 
34. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7430 (1973). 
35. 28 Fed. Reg. 9916 (1963) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § l.3(e) (1964·71)). 
36. 28 Fed. Reg. 3309 (1963), as amended, 29 Fed. Reg. 1719 (1964) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. § 9.18(a)(3) (1964-72)). 
37. 12 U.S.C. 24 Seventh (1970). See note 14 supra. 
38. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7376 (1973). This interpretation was important in pressuring state-
chartered banks to seek national charters. See, e.g., 1968 CAL. SUPT. OF BANKS ANN. 
REP. 26-27. See also text accompanying note 40 infra. 
39. For an early summary of the degree of national bank entry into these fields, see 
Beatty, Legal Limits of Bank Services, supra note 18, at 5-12. 
40. 1965 N.Y. SuPT. OF BANKS ANN. REP. 14-15 (Chase Manhattan Bank); 1968 CAL. 
SUPT. OF BANKS ANN. REP. 26-29 (Wells Fargo Bank). 
41. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAw § 96(13) (McKinney 1971) (travel agencies); Omo 
R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 1107.31 (Page 1968) (travel agencies). 
42. See, e.g., HAWAII REv. STAT. § 403.47.1 (Supp. 1971). See also GA. CODE ANN, 
§ 13-1802 (Supp. 1972). 
43. Baker, Watts & Co. v. Saxon, 261 F. Supp. 247 (1966), a!fd. sub. nom. 
Port of N.Y. Authority v. Baker, Watts & Co., 392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
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tions,44 the operation of mutual investment funds,45 and the opera-
tion of travel agencies.46 
As the Comptroller's rulings came under attack, many banks 
turned to a second device for expanding the scope of their activities 
-the one-bank holding company. Banks were barred from engaging 
in nonbank activities through their own subsidiaries under regula-
tions issued by the Comptroller of the Currency and by the Federal 
Reserve Board that limited subsidiaries of banks to activities that 
the banks could perform themselves.47 However, these restrictions 
did not apply to "bank holding companies"-more complicated 
corporate structures in which the nonbanking companies are sub-
sidiaries not of the bank, but of the holding company, which also con-
trols the bank. Bank holding companies that controlled two or more 
banks had been regulated since 1956 under the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act,48 which placed fairly narrow limits on the scope of 
activities in which affiliated companies could engage.49 Under this 
Act, the Federal Reserve Board performed a variety of regulatory 
functions, including approving the acquisition of both bank and 
nonbank subsidiaries by bank holding companies.50 The Board's 
44. Georgia Assn. of lndep. Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Saxon, 268 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Ga. 
1967), a/fd., 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968). 
45. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971). 
46. Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 338 F. Supp. 721 (D. Mass.), affd., 472 F.2d 
427 (1st Cir. 1972). Suits have also been filed challenging the Comptroller's ruling 
allowing banks to sell data processing services. E.g., Association of Data Processing 
Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, No. 3-67 Civ. 165 (D. Minn., filed June 15, 1967). 
Both Arnold Tours and Data Processing were initially dismissed on the ground that 
plaintiffs lacked standing. Appeals of those decisions led to landmark decisions on the 
standing question by the Supreme Court. See Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 
45 (1970); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 
150 (1970). The 1970 amendments specifically provide that a potential competitor of 
a bank holding company can seek review in a court of appeals of a Board decision 
that adversely affects it. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 § 105, 12 
U.S.C, 1850 (1970). Because of the broad grant of power given the Board by the Act 
and the lack of clear congressional intent concerning the purposes of the Act, see text 
accompanying notes 248-59 infra, the courts are unlikely to overturn a Board decision. 
See generally Chase, supra note 1, at 1248-51. 
47. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7376 (1973) (Comptroller); 12 C.F.R. § 250.141 (1973) (Federal Re-
serve Board). 
48. See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 2a, 70 Stat. 133. 
49. Bank holding companies were generally forbidden to hold shares of nonbank 
companies. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 4(a), 70 Stat. 135. The major 
exceptions were shares of companies performing specified services for the holding 
company system and shares of companies that were so "closely related to the business 
of banking as to be properly incident thereto." Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 
ch. 240, §§ 4(c)(l), (6), 70 Stat. 136, 137. In 1966, the list of exceptions was expanded 
to include shares of companies eligible for investment by national banks. Act of July 
I, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 8(b), 80 Stat. 268. 
50. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, §§ 3, 4, 70 Stat. 134, 135. 
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interpretation of the Act was very strict, and, consequently, holding 
companies were in some ways more tightly restrained than banks.'i1 
However, holding companies that controlled only one bank were 
not within the scope of the Act52 nor, therefore, subject to its limita-
tions on nonbank subsidiaries.53 In 1956 and again in 1966, Congress 
considered placing one-bank holding companies under the Act. Each 
time the suggestion was rejected on the grounds that such holding 
companies were causing no serious problems and subjecting them to 
the requirements of the Act would seriously harm the many small 
banks that were their primary banking components.54 
After 1966, as the courts began to curtail the Comptroller's ex-
pansive interpretations, the character of one-bank holding com-
panies changed drastically. The nation's largest banks rushed to 
form one-bank holding companies,55 many of which engaged in 
commercial and industrial enterprises not even arguably within 
banking powers, such as TV broadcasting, furniture manufacturing, 
and pizza parlors.56 In February 1969, Congress began to consider 
amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act that would extend 
it to one-bank holding companies; the resulting amendments became 
effective on December 31, 1970.57 
II. FEATURES OF THE 1970 AMENDMENTS 
AFFECTING THE SCOPE OF BANKING ACTIVITIES 
The main thrust of the 1970 amendments was to expand the 
coverage of the Act significantly. This was accomplished by modify-
ing several key definitions. 
First, "bank holding company" was redefined as "any company 
which has control over any bank or over any company that is or 
becomes a bank holding company by virtue of this Chapter."08 
Under this new definition, control of one bank is sufficient to bring 
a company within the coverage of the Act. 
Second, the definition of "company" was expanded. The original 
51. See text accompanying notes 244-47 infra. 
52. See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 2(a), 70 Stat. 133. 
53. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 4, 70 Stat. 135. 
54. 1970 SENATE REPORT, supra note I, at 2. 
55. Id. at 3. 
56. H.R. REP. No. 387, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 27-30 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 HousE 
REPORT] (individual views of Chairman Patman). For a more complete tabulation of 
one-bank holding company activities as of December 31, 1970, see FED. RES. BuLL., Dec. 
1972, at A99-IOI. 
57. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 
1760 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50, 1971-78 (1970)). See generally 1970 Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 2; 1969 House Hearings, supra note I. 
58. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § IOI(a), 
84 Stat. 1760, amending Bank Holding Company Act § 2(a)(l) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 184l(a)(l) (1970)). 
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act included "any corporation, business trust, association or similar 
organization"t.o and explicitly excepted partnerships and govern-
ment-owned corporations. 60 The 1970 amendment added partner-
ships to the definition, thus subjecting them for the first time to the 
restrictions imposed by the Act.61 
Third, a new definition of "control" was added. Previously en-
acted definitions that provided that one company has control over 
another if it controls at least twenty-five per cent of any class of 
voting securities62 or if it controls the election of a majority of the 
directors or trustees63 were retained. The amendments provided in 
addition that control exists if "the Board determines ... that the 
company directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over 
the management or policies of the bank or company."64 
Balancing these expansions in the coverage of the Act are other 
amendments that tend to liberalize the scope of activities in which 
a bank holding company will be permitted to engage. The Act de-
fines the permissible scope of holding company interest in nonbank-
ing organizations in section 4.65 The general mandate of the section 
is that 
(a) Except as othen\Tise provided in this chapter, no bank holding 
company shall-
(!) ... acquire direct or indirect ownership or control of any 
voting shares of any company which is not a bank, or 
(2) . . . retain direct or indirect ownership or control of any 
voting shares of any company which is not a bank or bank holding 
company or engage in any activities other than (A) those of banking 
or of managing or controlling banks and other subsidiaries autho-
rized under this chapter or of furnishing services to or performing 
services for its subsidiaries, and (B) those permitted under paragraph 
(8) of subsection ( c) of this section. 66 
The 1970 amendments made three modifications that affect the im-
59. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 2(b), 70 Stat. 133. 
60. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, §§ 2(b)(l), (3), 70 Stat. 133. 
61. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § IOI(b), 
84 Stat. 1760, amending Bank Holding Company Act § 2(a)(l) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 184I(a)(l) (1970)). 
62. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 2(a)(l), 70 Stat. 133, as amended, 
12 U.S.C. § 184I(a)(2)(A) (1970). 
63. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 2(a)(2), 70 Stat. 133, as amended, 
12 U.S.C. § 184l(a)(2)(B) (1970). 
64. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § IOI(a), 
84 Stat. 1760, amending Bank Holding Company Act § 2(a)(2)(C) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 184I(a)(2)(C) (1970)). The control requirements are further refined in the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act §§ 2(a)(3)-(6), 12 U.S.C. §§ 184I(a)(3)-(6) (1970). 
65. 12 u.s.c. § 1843 (1970). 
66. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (1970). See text accompanying note 71 infra for an expla-
nation of paragraph (8) of subsection (c). 
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pact of this mandate. The first is the so-called "grandfather" clause, 
a proviso to section 4(a)(2), which provides that "a company covered 
in 1970 may also engage in those activities in which directly or 
through a subsidiary (i) it was lawfully engaged on June 30, 1968 
... and (ii) it has been continuously engaged since June 30, 1968."67 
The second modification allows some one-bank holding com-
panies to continue to enjoy the favored status that they held prior to 
the amendments. This is section 4(d), which exempts certain holding 
companies that controlled one bank prior to July 1, 1968, and have 
not acquired another bank since that date. If the Board finds that 
such action "would not be substantially at variance with the purposes 
of this chapter," it may grant exemptions to avoid disrupting long-
established business relationships, to avoid forced sales of small lo-
cally owned banks, or to allow retention of banks that represent only 
a small part of the holding company's total interests and of the bank-
ing market.68 This provision differs from the grandfather clause in 
that one-bank holding companies exempt under section 4(d) may not 
only continue such operations as they had in 1968, but may also ex-
pand into other nonbank activities unless restricted by the Board's 
exemption order69 or by subsequent Board action.70 
The third modification is found in section 4(c)(8), which exempts 
from the requirements of section 4(a) "shares of any company the 
activities of which the Board after due notice and opportunity for 
hearing has determined (by order or regulation) to be so closely re-
lated to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper 
incident thereto."71 This exception applies both to ownership of 
shares of nonbank companies and to activities carried on directly by 
the holding company.72 Congress provided that "[i]n determining 
whether a particular activity is a proper incident to banking or man-
aging or controlling banks the Board shall consider whether its per-
formance by an affiliate of a holding company can reasonably be ex-
pected to produce benefits to the public . . . that outweigh possible 
adverse effects .... "13 
67. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (1970). 
68. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(d) (1970). 
69. See Bank Holding Company Act § 4(d), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(d) (1970). 
70. While the Act makes no provision for subsequent Board action, the Federal 
Reserve Board currently reserves the right to take such action in orders issued under 
the Bank Holding Company Act. See, e.g., Beneficial Corp., 58 FED. REs. BULL., 849, 850 
(1972): "[T]his determination is subject to revocation if the facts upon which it is 
based change in any material respect." 
71. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1970). 
72. Section 4(a)(2) provides that the company may not "engage in any activities 
other than • • . (B) those permitted under [section 4(c)(8)]." While 4(c)(8) exempts 
only the holding of shares of companies engaged in such activities, it is clear that the 
Board allows the holding company to carry on such activities directly. See, e.g., Cody 
Agency, Inc., 58 FED. R.Es. BULL. 736 (1972). 
73. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1970). 
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These three modifications will be the focus of discussion in this 
Comment. The steps that the Federal Reserve Board has taken to 
implement each will be surveyed and then evaluated in light of the 
congressional goals behind the enactment of the amendments. 
III. Section 4(a)(2): THE "GRANDFATHER" PRIVILEGES 
Under the proviso to section 4(a)(2), bank holding companies 
that were covered by the Act upon passage of the 1970 amendments 
may continue those activities in which they were engaged on June 
30, 1968, and in which they have been continuously engaged since 
that date. 74 This clause applies even if the manner in which the ac-
tivity is performed is restructured. Thus, if a holding company di-
rectly operated a drugstore on June 30, 1968, it can transfer that store 
to a subsidiary, or it can open additional drugstores directly or 
through subsidiaries.75 However, the acquisition after June 30, 1968, 
of a going concern engaged in the nonbanking business is prohib-
ited. 76 
"Grandfather" privileges are subject to termination if the Federal 
Reserve Board determines "having due regard for the purposes of 
this chapter that such action is necessary to prevent undue concen-
tration of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of in-
terest, or unsound banking practices . . . ."77 With regard to small 
banks, no time period is set within which the Board must exercise 
this power of revocation. However, companies controlling banks with 
assets in excess of 60 million dollars must be evaluated within two 
years of the effective date of the amendments, or within two years 
74. See text accompanying note 67 supra for text of statute. 
75. The Board has imposed one important restriction on this restructuring. In 
Whitney Holding Corp., 59 FED. REs. BULL. 371 (1973), one of Whitney's nonbank sub-
sidiaries (Berwick) owned land that was leased to farmers. Berwick had acquired the 
land in 1970 from a bank that had been a subsidiary of Whitney since 1962. The bank 
had acquired the land in 1933. Despite the fact that Whitney was a "company covered 
in 1970" and the apparent satisfaction of the requirements of section 4(a)(2), the Board 
denied grandfather privileges. It did so because "[a]n activity engaged in by a bank is 
regarded by the Board as not being an activity within the meaning and intent of the 
grandfather proviso in section 4(a)(2) of the Act." 59 FED. REs. BULL. at 371. 
It is difficult to see how the Board reached this conclusion given the statutory 
language and the relevant committee reports. In presenting the conference report 
to the Senate, Senator Sparkman said: "The conference adopted the Senate's view in 
including a provision which would allow [a company] the necessary flexibility to reorga-
nize within its internal structure so that it can shift responsibility for operating one or 
more of its grandfathered activities from one subsidiary to another, and from the hold-
ing company itself to a subsidiary and vice versa, or to form a new subsidiary for this 
particular purpose.'' 116 CONG. R.Ec. 42422, 42424 (1970) [hereinafter Senate Managers' 
Statement]. The House conferees agreed. See H.R. REP. No. 1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 
28 (1970) (statement of the House Managers) [hereinafter House Managers' Statement]. 
See also 1970 SENATE REPORT, supra note I, at 6: "In short, the holding company is 
given maximum flexibility to engage in the grandfathered activities in whatever man-
ner it desires, so long as it does not purchase an existing going concern.'' 
76. Bank Holding Company Act § 4(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 184ll(a)(2) (1970). 
77. Bank Holding Company Act § 4(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 184ll(a)(2) (1970). 
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after that level of bank assets is reached, whichever is later.78 The five 
factors to which the Board is to look in determining whether grand-
father privileges are to be terminated are identical to those adverse 
factors listed in section 4(c)(8).79 However, unlike section 4(c)(8), the 
grandfather proviso does not require that positive benefits be demon-
strated. 80 Nor need the Board distinguish between those activities 
that are closely related to banking and those that are not. 81 
The Board has undertaken a review of the rights of bank holding 
companies to retain grandfather privileges in sixty-seven cases. On 
September 26, 1972, it tentatively approved the continuation of the 
activities of twenty-three holding companies.82 Of that group only 
one83 was engaged in activities that would not also have been per-
mitted under section 4, and the tentative approval of that application 
was subsequently reversed. 84 On the same day that these tentative ap-
provals were issued, the Board announced that it was evaluating ad-
ditional companies to determine if they should be allowed to retain 
their grandfather privileges.85 Many of these were engaged in activi-
ties quite remote from banking, such as real estate, farming, manu-
facturing, and merchandising. 86 
On December 26, 1972, the Board announced its final decisions 
in thirty of the cases; these thirty companies were found not entitled 
to grandfather privileges, although some of them could continue 
their nonbanking activities under other sections of the Act.87 To 
date, none of the individual orders that the Board has published with 
regard to the remaining thirty-seven companies has required a di-
vestiture of activities initially eligible for grandfather privileges.88 In 
most of these thirty-seven cases the nonbanking activities are on a 
78. Bank Holding Company Act § 4(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (1970). 
79. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1970). See text accompanying note 191 infra. 
80. See Bank Holding Company Act § 4(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (1970). 
81. See Bank Holding Company Act § 4(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (1970). But see 
note 87 infra for an indication that the Board may deny grandfather privileges when 
the activity qualifies for an exemption under some other provision. 
82. 37 Fed. Reg. 21382 (1972). 
83. Ribso, Inc., was the owner and lessor of some residual mineral rights. 37 Fed. 
Reg. 21382 (1972). 
84. See text accompanying notes ll8-19 infra. 
85. 37 Fed. Reg. 22414 (1972). 
86. 37 Fed. Reg. 22414-16 (1972). 
87. In Frank P. Doyle Trust, et al., 38 Fed. Reg. 918 (1973), the Board found that 
none of 12 bank holding companies had been engaged in nonbanking activities on June 
30, 1968, other than activities permitted by section 4(c). In Sumitomo Bank Ltd., et al., 
38 Fed. Reg. 920 (1973), the Board found that 18 bank holding companies had been 
engaged only in banking on June 30, 1968. See CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. ~ 95,838 
(Bd. of Govs., Fed. Res. Sys., Press Release, Dec. 26, 1972). 
88. Divestiture has been required in a number of cases, but always on the grounds 
that the activity had been commenced after June 30, 1968. See, e.g., Alaska Bancshares, 
Inc., 59 FED. REs. BULL. 2ll (1973); Western &: S. Life Ins. Co., 38 Fed. Reg. 6104 (1973). 
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small scale, 89 although some charitable foundations that are covered 
by the Act have been allowed to retain holdings in large nonbanking 
businesses.0° Future decisions, involving such activities as oil and gas 
mining and exploration,01 hotel construction,92 and air carrier opera-
tions,93 are likely to present harder questions. 
When grandfather privileges are allowed the Board frequently 
places severe limits on the extent to which the bank holding com-
pany can expand into the nonbanking activities. Sometimes the limi-
tations are fairly general, such as a prohibition on any substantial 
changes in the scope of the holding company's activities.94 In other 
cases, the Board's restrictions are very specific, such as that a real 
estate development operation not acquire additional land,95 or that 
a finance company operation not expand to any new locations.96 
The introduction of the grandfather proviso arose from the same 
concerns that had made Congress reluctant in the past to include one-
bank holding companies within the coverage of the Act:97 It felt that 
the one-bank holding companies existing at the time set in the clause, 
most of which were quite small, had not caused great problems98 and 
was thus reluctant to require them to undergo the hardships of di-
vestiture, which would be particularly harsh for small banks.99 The 
Board's rather strict approach, and its apparent recognition that the 
dangers are reduced in small enterprises, is consistent with the pur-
pose of the proviso. 
In making its determinations under this clause the Board was to 
consider the listed adverse effects,100 thus guaranteeing that those 
89. In Estate of James Millikin, 38 Fed. Reg. 1153 (1973), the bank holding com-
pany (a charitable trust) owned rental farm and residential property. The respective 
market shares (in Decatur, Illinois) were .03 per cent and .I per cent. See also Contract 
Leasing Corp., 38 Fed. Reg. 1538 (1973); Zions Utah Bancorporation, 38 Fed. Reg. 1310 
(1973). 
90. See, e.g., Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, 38 Fed. Reg. 1537 (1973) (holding 
company owns all the shares of two St. Louis, Missouri, utility companies). See also 
Scaly &: Smith Foundation for the John Sealy Hosp., 38 Fed. Reg. 1155 (1973); Estate 
of James Millikin, 38 Fed. Reg. 1153 (1973). 
91. 37 Fed. Reg. 22415 (1972) (Republic Natl. Bank of Dallas). 
92. 37 Fed. Reg. 22416 (1972) (Houston Natl. Corp.). 
93. 37 Fed. Reg. 22414 (1972) (World Airways, Inc.). 
94. See, e.g., Sealy&: Smith Foundation for the John Sealy Hosp., 38 Fed. Reg. 1155, 
1156 (1973). 
95. Alaska Bancshares, Inc., 59 FED. REs. BULL. 211, 212 (1973). 
96. Minnesota Small Loan Co., 38 Fed. Reg. 1308, 1309 (1973); Delta Loan &: Fin. 
Co., 38 Fed. Reg. 1151, 1152 (1973). 
97. See text accompanying note 54 supra. 
98. 1970 SENATE REPORT, supra note I, at 4. 
99. Many of these one-bank holding companies controlled small banks in small 
communities that did not generate sufficient earnings to attract competent manage-
ment. Extra earnings produced by affiliated businesses helped to counterbalance this 
condition. 1969 House Hearings, supra note I, at 308. 
100. See text accompanying note 77 supra. 
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holding companies that were causing serious problems would not es-
cape the full rigor of the Act.101 The approach taken by the Board 
has been to approve the continuation of the business if no serious 
negative factors are present, without consideration of potential pub-
lic benefits.102 
It is not yet clear whether the Board will ever weigh positive fac-
tors when disadvantages are found to exist. In the only cases to date 
in which serious problems were found, the Board did not consider 
positive factors.103 The proviso itself leaves the question unclear, re-
quiring only that the Board act if it determines "having due regard 
for the purposes of this chapter that such action is necessary to pre-
vent" a listed adverse effect.104 A requirement that benefits be con-
sidered may be derived from the language "having due regard for 
the purposes of this chapter." This inference is not unreasonable, as 
Congress intended that companies eligible for grandfather privileges 
be given more lenient treatment than companies entering similar 
nonbanking activities after June 30, 1968, and it would be odd if 
public benefits could justify a harmful acquisition under the "closely 
related to banking" provision, 105 but not under the grandfather pro-
vision. 
Closer examination reveals, however, that a refusal to weigh bene-
fits against injuries does not unreasonably put companies seeking 
grandfather privileges at a disadvantage. The grandfather exemption 
is premised on the congressional finding that the companies covered 
cause no serious harm.106 Once this conclusion is shown to be incor-
rect in a particular case, the entire justification for grandfather priv-
ileges disappears. In any event, if the benefits that an activity gives 
rise to outweigh the injuries, the holding company can argue that the 
activity is closely related to banking and thus exempt under section 
4(c)(8). 
In the absence of adverse factors, however, a company that has 
carried on an activity closely related to banking since June 30, 1968, 
and can thus use the grandfather clause, has an advantage over a com-
pany that began such activities more recently. Under section 4(c)(8), 
an application may not be approved without an affirmative showing 
101. House Managers' Statement, supra note 75, at 26-27. 
102. See, e.g., Minnesota Small Loan Co., 38 Fed. Reg. 1308 (1973); Delta Loan &: 
Fin. Co., 38 Fed. Reg. ll51 (1973). 
103. In n:H. Baldwin Co., 38 Fed. Reg. 16279 (1973), the Board disapproved of the 
holding company's former practice of directing its subsidiary bank to maintain corre-
spondent balances in banks with which the holding company maintained lines of credit. 
However, the Board did not look to benefits and relied upon the company's assurances 
that the practice would not be resumed. See also Alaska Bancshares, Inc., 59 FED. REs. 
BULL. 211 (1973). 
104. Bank Holding Company Act § 4(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. 1843(a)(2) (1970). 
105. See text accompanying notes 237-41 infra. 
106. 1970 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4. 
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that public benefits exceed harms; the grandfather clause, on the 
other hand, allows entirely benign retentions to continue. 
The Board has not yet considered whether any holding com-
panies with less than 60 million dollars in bank assets should be per-
mitted to exercise grandfather privileges. However, given the con-
gressional policy behind the proviso, one would expect the Board to 
be more willing to permit holding companies controlling small banks 
to continue nonbanking activities.107 In addition, it is not yet clear 
whether the Board will adhere to the principle, expressed by Con-
gress,108 that the fact that a company has grandfather privileges does 
not create a presumption that the privileges should continue, al-
though the strict conditions imposed by Board decisions100 indicate 
a willingness to terminate for fairly minor changes in circumstances. 
The Board should be especially careful to avoid this presumption 
in those cases in which mandatory review is not required, although 
the heavy workload of the Board110 will probably preclude close con-
sideration of many of those cases. 
The committee reports indicate that Congress intended to make 
the grandfather clause applicable only to one-bank holding com-
panies.111 However, multibank companies may be covered by the 
literal language of the proviso in two situations. First, some "com-
panies covered in 1970" that had previously been lawfully engaged 
in activities impermissible under the Act, as amended, were in 
fact multibank holding companies before the amendments. They 
might be covered either under the new control test, 112 or as partner-
ships, which the 1970 amendments included for the first time in the 
definition of "company."113 If Smith, Jones & Co., a partnership, 
owned nvo banks and a steel company on June 30, 1968 (and has con-
tinuously operated the steel company since that date), the require-
ments of the proviso to section 4(a)(2) are met, and apparently the 
firm would be entitled to grandfather privileges. If the partnership 
in question is relatively small, as it is likely to be, this result is ap-
propriate, for the hardships of divestiture would be at least as great 
as in the case of a one-bank company. 
107. See note 99 supra; House Managers' Statement, supra note 75, at 26. 
108. House Managers' Statement, supra note 75, at 27. 
109. See text accompanying notes 94-96 supra. 
110. In 1972, the Board issued 337 orders under the Bank Holding Company Act. 
Fm. R.Es. BULL., Dec. 1972, at All5-17. In 1971, the figure was 196. Id., Dec. 1971, at 
Al09-IO. In 1969, the Board issued only 87 such orders. Id., Dec. 1969, at AI04-05. 
111. House Managers' Statement, supra note 75, at 26: "The principal justification 
for providing a grandfather clause was to protect the traditional small town bank 
holding company." But see id. at 27. 
112. Bank Holding Company Act § 2(a)(2)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 184l(a)(2)(C) (1970). See 
text accompanying note 64 supra. 
113. Bank Holding Company Act § 2(b), 12 U.S.C. § 184l(b) (1970). See text accom-
panying note 61 supra. 
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However, two Board decisions dealing with one-bank holding 
companies indicate that it is unlikely that a multibank holding com-
pany will be brought under the coverage of the proviso through the 
application of the new control test. The proviso applies only to "a 
company covered in 1970," defined in section 2(b) as "a company 
which becomes a bank holding company as a result of the enactment 
of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 and which 
would have been a bank holding company on June 30, 1968, if these 
amendments had been enacted on that date."114 The Board has inter-
preted the latter requirement very strictly. In Perpetual Corp.,115 the 
bank holding company owned 24.86 per cent of one bank on June 30, 
1968 (and acquired additional shares thereafter). The Board con-
cluded that the company would not have been a bank holding com-
pany on June 30, 1968, if the 1970 amendments had been in effect 
at that date, since 25 per cent ownership would have been required 
to establish control.116 It totally failed to consider whether either of 
the other two control tests had been met.117 If the 25 per cent test 
conclusively establishes that control exists, ownership of 24.86 per 
cent would seem to suggest an inquiry into the other possible means 
of establishing whether or not a company has control. 
But the Board expressly refused to apply the new control test to 
determine if a company qualified for the grandfather proviso in 
Ribso, Inc.118 The holding company owned 20.82 per cent of the vot-
ing shares of a bank on June 30, 1968, and thereafter acquired addi-
tional shares, raising its ownership to over 25 per cent. Ribso con-
tended that it exercised a "controlling influence" over the bank as of 
June 30, 1968-thus meeting the definition of a "company covered 
in 1970"-but the Board refused to consider this claim. It said that 
decisions as to the existence of a controlling influence must be made 
by the Board after notice and opportunity for hearing, operate only 
prospectively, and cannot relate back to a time prior to the date of 
114. 12 U.S.C. § 184l(b) (1970). 
115. 38 Fed. Reg. 2238 (1973). 
116. Bank Holding Company Act § 2(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 184I(a)(2) (1970): "Any 
company has control over a bank or over any company if-(A) the company directly 
or indirectly or acting through one or more other persons owns, controls, or has 
power to vote 25 per centum or more of any class of voting securities of the bank or 
company •... " 
117. Bank Holding Company Act § 2(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2) (1970): "Any 
company has control over a bank or over any company if- ... (B) the company con• 
trols in any manner the election of a majority of the directors or trustees of the bank 
or company; or (C) the Board determines, after notice and opportunity for hearing, 
that the company directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the 
management or policies of the bank or company." Section 2(a)(2)(B) was part of the 
original Act; section 2(a)(2)(C) was added by the 1970 amendments. See text accom-
panying notes 62-64 supra. 
118. 38 Fed. Reg. 7029 (1973). 
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the Board's determination.119 Ribso indicates an extremely narrow 
interpretation of the reach of the grandfather provision. If the 1970 
amendments had been in effect on June 30, 1968 (as section 4(a)(2) 
asks us to suppose), Ribso's status as a bank holding company could 
have been established by a finding that it "exercise[d] a controlling 
influence over the management" of the bank. The Board, however, 
was unwilling to undertake such an inquiry. 
This strict interpretation of the eligibility requirements indicates 
that the Board will not be generous with grandfather privileges. This 
is in accord with the congressional objective of alleviating hardship 
in a special class of cases (small banks that are causing no serious 
adverse effects) and with the congressional fear that permitting 
continuation in some cases would undermine the purposes of the 
act.120 
A second situation in which a multibank holding company would 
fall under the literal provisions of the grandfather clause could 
arise as follows: Ace Realty, a real estate brokerage company, owned 
the First State Bank on June 30, 1968. During 1971, Ace sought and 
received Board approval of its acquisition of the Second State Bank. 
Under these facts, Ace would be a "company covered in 1970" which 
was, and has been continuously, engaged in the real estate business, 
yet is not a one-bank holding company. In the interest of fairness, 
Ace should be as entitled to grandfather privileges as any one-bank 
holding company. Any adverse effects created by the expansion 
could be weighed in the course of determining whether the privileges 
should be allowed to continue. The Board's position, however, is still 
uncertain.121 
If multibank holding companies are covered by the grandfather 
clause, a problem arises with regard to the 60 million dollar limit on 
bank assets that triggers mandatory Board review. The statute re-
quires this review "in the case of any such company controlling a 
bank having bank assets in excess of $60,000,000 on or after Decem-
ber 31, 1970."122 If a partnership owns ten banks, each with assets of 
50 million dollars, as well as other, nonbanking companies, it would 
119. This ruling by the Board represents an abrupt shift from the practice adopted 
in Trust Co. of N.J., 58 Fm. REs. BuLL. 717, 719-21 (1972), in which the Board under-
took a detailed retrospective analysis of an alleged controlling influence relationship. 
120. House Managers' Statement, supra note 75, at 26. 
121. In October 1971, the Board issued a proposed regulation that would have 
denied grandfather privileges to bank holding companies otherwise entitled to such 
privileges that had acquired another bank, unless the order approving acquisition of 
the additional bank specified otherwise. 36 Fed. Reg. 20779 (1971). Then, in April 1972, 
the Board withdrew the proposal and announced that each application would be con-
sidered individually. 37 Fed. Reg. 9044 (1972). 
122. Bank Holding Company Act § 4(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (1970) (emphasis 
added). 
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not be subject to mandatory review under a literal reading of the 
amendment. However, since the conference report indicates that it 
was the amount of bank assets controlled by the holding company 
that Congress considered important,123 this provision should be read 
to refer to the total bank assets controlled by the company rather 
than to the assets of the largest bank. 
The Board has not yet reached a decision on this question. How-
ever, the matter has been virtually settled, for the two-year period 
since the enactment of the amendments has already passed, and the 
Board has yet to decide a case in which the 60 million dollar limit 
was measured by totaling the assets of several subsidiary banks. This 
suggests either that the situation suggested above does not actually 
exist or that the Board has chosen to interpret the language of sec-
tion 4(a)(2) literally. 
IV. SECTION 4(d): EXEMPTION OF CERTAIN ONE-BANK 
HOLDING COMPANIES 
Under section 4(d), the Federal Reserve Board can exempt from 
the limitations on nonbanking activities imposed by section 4(a) 
certain companies that controlled one bank on July I, 1968, and have 
not subsequently acquired another bank. Unless to do so would be 
at variance with the purposes of the Act, the Board is authorized to 
grant such exemptions to promote any one of three objectives: 
(I) to avoid disrupting business relationships that have existed over 
a long period of years without adversely affecting the banks or com-
munities involved, or (2) to avoid forced sales of small locally owned 
banks to purchasers not similarly representative of community inter-
ests, or (3) to allow retention of banks that are so small in relation 
to the holding company's total interests and so small in relation to 
the banking market to be served as to minimize the likelihood that 
the bank's powers to grant or deny credit may be influenced by a 
desire to further the holding company's other interests.124 
In permitting these exemptions Congress sought "to cover situations 
existing with respect to one bank holding companies that have con-
trolled over a long period of years one small bank, usually in a small 
town where some particular hardship may be created if the holding 
company were forced to divest itself of its bank."125 The Board deci-
sions have scrupulously followed the command of the statute by 
holding that any one of the three statutory objectives is sufficient to 
123. "With respect to bank holding companies which control bank assets in excess 
of $60 million, the Board is required under the Act to reach a determination within 
two years .••• " House Managers' Statement, supra note 75, at 26 (emphasis added). 
124. Bank Holding Company Act § 4(d), 12 U.S.C. § I843(d) (1970). 
125. House Managers' Statement, note 75, supra, at 23. 
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qualify a bank for exemption. An exemption has been denied only 
where none of the three grounds was present.126 
The Board has ruled on nine applications for section 4( d) exemp-
tions; eight of these were approved. In five of these cases the holding 
company was a large diversified corporation,127 which opened its 
bank as a matter of convenience to the employees of one of its sub-
sidiaries located in an area with inadequate banking facilities. In no 
case did the assets of the bank exceed three per cent of the assets of 
the conglomerate, so the size factor suggested exemption. All five 
applications were approved, despite the lack of findings that forced 
sales would be harmful. In four of the cases, where the banks had 
been acquired during the 1920's and 1930's, their long-standing busi-
ness relationships, as well as the size factor, suggested exemption.128 
The fifth case, Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.,129 where the 
holding company had only operated the bank since 1958, was de-
cided on the basis of size alone. The Board found in all five cases that 
there was sufficient competition with other banks so that misuse of 
bank ownership was unlikely and that there was no evidence of past 
misuse of bank credit. A sixth case,130 decided exclusively on the 
basis of the size factor,131 suggests that the size requirement may not 
be as strict as it would appear from the five cases discussed above. In 
1965, the holding company, the largest commercial printer in the 
United States, had participated in the organization of a bank near 
its largest facility. At the time of the application the assets of the 
bank represented almost ten per cent of the holding company's 
assets, although its net income was only three tenths of one per cent 
of that of the holding company. 
In two other cases the size factor was not present, but exemptions 
were granted on the basis of the long-standing business relationships 
and the likelihood that forced sales would be to interests less con-
cerned with the communities. In Milton Hershey School & Trust132 
the holding company was not an operating industrial enterprise, so 
the size factor was not considered relevant. The Trust had held the 
bank since 1930, most of the bank's customers were employees of 
126. See text accompanying notes 135-37 infra. 
127. l3eneficial Corp., 58 FED. Iu:s. l3ULL. 849 (1972); Minnesota Mining &:: Mfg. Co., 
58 Fro. Iu:s. BuLL. 598 (1972); CPC Intl. Corp., 58 Fro. Iu:s. BULL. 429 (1972); Goodyear 
Tire &: Rubber Co., 58 FED. Iu:s. l3ULL. 76 (1972); Olin Corp., 58 FED. Iu:s. BULL. 75 
(1972). 
128. Beneficial Corp., 58 FED. Iu:s. BULL. 849 (1972) (bank not actually opened until 
1952); CPC Intl. Corp., 58 FED. Iu:s. BULL. 429 (1972); Goodyear Tire &: Rubber Co., 
58 FED. Iu:s. BULL. 76 (1972); Olin Corp., 58 FED. R.Es. l3ULL. 75 (1972). 
129. 58 Fro. lu:s. BULL. 598 (1972). 
130. R. R. Donnelley &: Sons Co., 38 Fed. Reg. 13583 (1973). 
131. 38 Fed. Reg. at 13584. 
132. 58 FED. RES. BULL. 319 (1972). 
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another subsidiary of the holding company, and most of its loans 
were to people living in the Hershey, Pennsylvania, community. 
Requiring divestiture, the Board stressed, would be likely to lead to 
a sale of the bank to interests less concerned with the community, 
who would use the bank's resources for more profitable investments 
elsewhere.133 The holding company in Heldenfels Brothers134 was a 
construction contractor (total assets of 10.7 million dollars) that had 
begun operations in Rockport, Texas, in 1917 and had controlled the 
First National Bank of Rockport for thirty-seven years. The Board 
found that, although Heldenfels Brothers had made efforts to 
broaden ownership of the bank among local residents, a forced sale 
would necessarily be to an outside purchaser less interested in local 
needs. 
A ninth application was denied because none of the three 
grounds were present.135 The business relationship was not of long 
standing, for the holding company had acquired the bank in 1963, 
and there was no evidence of a unique relationship between the 
bank and the community.136 Nor did the size of the bank relative to 
the holding company and the market indicate that an exemption 
would be appropriate. The bank's assets formed forty-six per cent of 
the assets of the holding company, which operated a chain of grocery 
and drug stores, and the deposits held by the bank were twenty per 
cent of those in its market.137 In the absence of the three factors the 
application was rejected despite the lack of any finding of misuse of 
ownership of the bank. 
V. SECTION 4(c)(8) 
A. Activities "Closely Related to Bankinft' 
Section 4(c)(8), as amended in 1970, allows a bank holding com-
pany to retain or acquire shares in a company that engages in non-
banking activities "so closely related to banking ... as to be a proper 
incident thereto."138 In determining what activities are properly 
incident to banking the Board is to consider if there might be 
"benefits to the public . . . that outweigh possible adverse ef-
fects .... "139 There are three different ways in which the Federal 
Reserve Board has determined which activities are "closely related 
to banking." First, it has issued a series of regulations delineating the 
133. 58 FED. RFs. BULL. at 320. 
134. 38 Fed. Reg. 1540 (1973). 
135. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 58 FED. RFs. BULL, 677 (1972). 
136. 58 FED. R.Es. BULL. at 677. 
137. 58 FED. RFs. BULL. at 677. 
138. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1970). 
139. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1970). 
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basic activities that are so regarded.140 Second, in response to in-
quiries, the Board has issued interpretations of its regulations.141 
Finally, the Board considers individual applications by bank holding 
companies to engage in particular activities. Some of these applica-
tions request a determination that the activities in question fall 
within the Board's regulations or interpretations,142 while others 
seek to have a new activity declared to be "closely related."143 To 
date, ten categories of activities have been listed in the regulations 
as being "closely related to banking" under section 4(c)(8): 144 
(I) Making or acquiring, for [the bank holding company's] own 
account or for the account of others, loans and other extensions of 
credit (including issuing letters of credit and accepting drafts), such 
as would be made, for example, by a mortgage, finance, credit card, 
or factoring company;145 
140. The rules issued regarding bank holding companies comprise Federal Reserve 
Board Regulation Y, which is codified in 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.l•.5 (1973). Activities that 
have been determined to be closely related to banking are found in 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a) 
(1973). 
141. The interpretations relating to activities determined to be closely related to 
banking are also part of Regulation Y and are contained in 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.123, 
.125·.128 (1973). 
142. See BankAmerica Corp., CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. ,I 95,716 (Bd. of Govs., 
Fed. Res. Sys., June 29, 1972), petition for review filed, BankAmerica Corp. v. Board of 
Govs., No. 72·2325, 9th Cir., July 28, 1972. 
143. See Citizens &: S. Natl. Bank and Citizens &: S. Holding Co., 57 FED. RF.s. BuLL. 
1037 (1971). 
144. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a) (1973). Two proposed changes in the regulations are 
currently under consideration. One proposal would add "Performing or carrying on 
armored car or courier services" to the list of closely related activities. Proposed Reg. 
Y § 225.4(a)(ll), 36 Fed. Reg. 21897 (1971). The other would revise the leasing para-
graph of Regulation Y (12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(6) (1973)) so as to include leasing of both 
personal and real property. Proposed Amendment to Reg. Y § 225.4(a)(6), 37 Fed. Reg. 
26534 (1972). See notes 181-84 infra and accompanying text for discussion of the spe-
cific provisions of this proposal. At the request of several bank holding companies, 
the Board has also requested comments on a proposal to add the underwriting of 
mortgage guaranty insurance to the list of closely related activities. See 38 Fed. Reg. 
13572 (1973). 
The Board has also issued an interpretation that specifies activities it has found 
are not closely related to banking: insurance premium funding (i.e., the combined 
~ale of insurance and mutual funds), underwriting life insurance that is not sold in 
connection with a credit u-ansaction, real estate brokerage, land development, real 
estate syndication, management consulting, property management, operation of savings 
and loan associations. 12 C.F.R. § 225.126 (1973). This interpretation was adopted May 
•!, 1972, see 37 Fed. Reg. 9022 (1972), and was expanded to its present scope on Sep-
tember 20, 1972, see 37 Fed. Reg. 20329 (1972). It is largely based on cases that the 
Board had previously decided. See, e.g., cases discussed in note 145 infra and in text 
accompanying notes 157-59, 170-73 infra. 
145. The Board has ruled that this regulation does not sanction a real estate 
brokerage operated in connection with a mortgage company, Boatmen's Bankshares, 
Inc., 58 FED. RF.s. BULL. 427 (1972), or a land development operation, also connected 
with a mortgage company, that purchased, improved, and sold land to builders and 
acted as a joint venturer in real estate developments. UB Fin. Corp., 58 FED. RF.s. 
BULL. 428 (1972). See also 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.126(c), (d) (1973), discussed in note 144 supra. 
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(2) Operating as an industrial bank, Morris Plan bank, or indus-
trial loan company, in the manner authorized by State law so long 
as the institution does not both accept demand deposits and make 
commercial loans;l46 
(3) Servicing loans and other extensions of credit for any person;147 
(4) Performing or carrying on any one or more of the functions or 
activities that may be performed or carried on by a trust company 
(including activities of a fiduciary, agency, or custodian nature), in 
the manner authorized by State law so long as the institution does 
not both accept demand deposits and make commercial loans;148 
(5) Acting as investment or financial adviser to the extent of (i) 
serving as the advisory company for a mortgage or a real estate 
investment trust; (ii) serving as investment adviser, as defined in 
section 2(a)(20) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, to an in-
vestment company registered under that Act; (iii) providing port-
folio investment advice to any other person; (iv) furnishing general 
economic information and advice, general economic statistical fore-
casting services and industry studies; and (v) providing financial ad-
vice to State and local governments, such as with respect to the 
issuance of their securities;149 
(6) Leasing personal property and equipment, or acting as agent, 
broker, or adviser in leasing of such property, where at the inception 
of the initial lease the expectation is that the effect of the transaction 
and reasonably anticipated future transactions with the same lessee 
as to the same property will be to compensate the lessor for not less 
than the lessor's full investment in the property;150 
(7) Making equity and debt investments in corporations or projects 
designed primarily to promote community welfare, such as the eco-
nomic rehabilitation and development of low-income areas;1ti1 
(8) (i) Providing bookkeeping or data processing services for the 
internal operations of the holding company and its subsidiaries and 
(ii) storing and processing other banking, financial, or related eco-
146. While the Board has approved applications under this provision, see, e.g., 
Zions Utah Bancorporation, 58 FED. R.Es. BuLL. '72 (1972), it has never interpreted 
precisely what is meant by "industrial bank, Morris Plan bank, or industrial loan 
company." 
If the industrial bank both accepts demand deposits and makes commercial loans, 
it is a "bank" under section 2(c), 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1970), and its acquisition by a 
bank holding company is subject to Board approval under section 3. 12 U.S.C. § 1842 
(1970). 
147. This provision has come before the Board most frequently in the context of 
the acquisition of mortgage companies. These decisions, however, do not indicate what 
the limits of the permissible activities may be. See, e.g., Central Natl. Chicago Corp., 
58 FED. R.Es. BULL. 69 (1972); UB Fin. Corp., 58 FED. RES. BULL. 428 (1972). 
148. The Board's only decision concerned with the scope of this regulation per-
mitted the provision of land escrow services. Wells, Fargo &: Co., 38 Fed. Reg. 1236 
(1973). Other applications that have been approved include Nortrust Corp., 58 FED. 
R.Es. BULL. 67 (1972); NCNB Corp., 58 FED. R.Es. BULL. 844, 847 (1972). 
149. This provision is discussed in text accompanying notes 155-73 infra. 
150. This provision is discussed in text accompanying notes 174-84 infra. 
151. This provision is discussed in text accompanying notes 185-90 infra. 
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nomic data, such as performing payroll, accounts receivable or pay-
able, or billing services.152 
(9) Acting as insurance agent or broker in offices at which the hold-
ing company or its subsidiaries are otherwise engaged in business 
(or in an office adjacent thereto) with respect to the following types 
of insurance: 
(i) Any insurance for the holding company and its subsidiaries; 
(ii) Any insurance that (a) is directly related to an extension of 
credit by a bank or a bank-related firm of the kind described in this 
regulation, or (b) is directly related to the provision of other finan-
cial services by a bank or such a bank-related firm, or ( c) is otherwise 
sold as a matter of convenience to the purchaser, so long as the pre-
mium income from sales within this subdivision (ii)(c) does not con-
stitute a significant portion of the aggregate insurance premium 
income of the holding company from insurance sold pursuant to this 
subdivision (ii); 
(iii) Any insurance sold in a community that (a) has a population 
not exceeding 5,000, or (b) the holding company demonstrates has 
inadequate insurance agency facilities;153 
(10) Acting as underwriter for credit life insurance and credit acci-
dent and health insurance which is directly related to extensions of 
credit by the bank holding company system.154 
152. The Board's interpretation of this regulation allows for considerable flexibility. 
It permits holding coinpanies to engage in those activities in which banks have en-
gaged in the past in carrying on their internal operations and accommodating cus-
tomers. 12 C.F.R. § 225.123(g) (1973). The Board intended to limit development of 
programs to those in which the data was of a financial nature. 12 C.F.R. § 225.123(g) 
(1973). In addition, the Board said that three activities incidental to such operations 
are also permissible: 
(1) Making excess computer time available to anyone so long as the only involve-
ment by the holding company system is furnishing the facility and necessary 
operating personnel; (2) selling a byproduct of the development of a program for 
a permissible data processing activity; and (3) furnishing any data processing 
service upon request of a customer if such data processing service is not otherwise 
reasonably available in the relevant market area. 
12 C.F.R. § 225.123(g) (1973). 
153. The Board has recently issued an extensive interpretation of this provision. See 
12 C.F.R. § 225.128 (1973). The interpretation, among other things, emphasizes that 
the provision regarding sales of otherwise unqualified insurance as a matter of con-
venience to the customer is not intended to allow entry into a general insurance 
agency business. 12 C.F.R. § 128(e)(l) (1973). A suit has been filed challenging the 
interpretations as an attempt to make substantive regulations without the required 
notice or procedure. National Assn. of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Board of Govs., CCH. FED. 
BANKING L. REP. 1J 95,809 (Petition for Review No. 72-1938, D.C. Cir., filed Oct. 5, 
1972). 
The Board decision in Fidelity Corp. of Pennsylvania, 38 Fed. Reg. 14795 (1973), 
further restricts the scope of permitted insurance activities by holding that sale of "level 
term" life insurance (coverage remains constant despite decreasing loan balance) in 
connection with credit transactions is not closely related to banking. 
154. See Virginia Natl. Bankshares, Inc., 38 Fed. Reg. 12169 (1973). The bank hold-
ing company showed that its customers would gain a projected ten to fifteen per cent 
premium saving as compared with the costs of other available insurance. Such a show-
ing meets the Board's criteria set out in a footnote to the regulation. See 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.4(a)(l0) n.3 (1973). 
The Board has determined that undenvriting level term life insurance (see note 
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Three of these categories (Regulations 5, 6, and 7) have caused 
certain interpretative difficulties. They will be discussed in detail be-
low, along with the relevant interpretations and decisions. 
The fifth regulation has been amended twice.155 The most im-
portant interpretation of clause (i)156 is in BankAmerica Corp.,m 
which held that a subsidiary that would "organize, structure, place, 
manage, and supervise real estate syndications ... as the sole general 
partner ... and sell limited partnership interests to individuals" was 
not closely related to banking.158 "[S]uch activities," the Board con-
cluded, "go beyond the functions performed by an advisory company 
to a real estate investment trust."159 
The proper scope of clause (ii) has been the subject of an exten-
sive interpretative ruling,160 in which the Board attempted to restrict 
bank holding companies to the limits set for banks by the Banking 
Act of 1933,161 as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Investment 
Company Institute v. Camp.162 The Board's ruling reads Investment 
Company Institute as forbidding a "bank holding company to spon-
sor, organize or control a mutual fund,"168 but does not apply this 
restriction "to closed-end investment companies as long as such com-
panies are not primarily or frequently engaged in the issuance, sale 
and distribution of securities."164 The bank holding company must 
insulate itself as much as possible from the closed-end funds that it 
advises. The funds must have names dissimilar to those of the bank 
holding company and its subsidiary banks.165 The holding company 
must not extend credit to the investment company or hold its 
securities (even in a fiduciary capacity or as collateral for loans).100 
Nor is the holding company allowed to participate in the promotion 
or sale of the investment company's securities.167 These rules are 
153 supra) in connection with credit transactions is not closely related. Philadelphia 
Natl. Corp., 38 Fed. Reg. 16678 (1973). 
155. See 36 Fed. Reg. 10778 (1971) (original rule), as amended, 37 Fed. Reg. 1463 
(1972), as amended, 37 Fed. Reg. 11771 (1972). 
156. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(5)(i) (1973). This provision is set out in the text accompany-
ing note 149 supra. 
157. CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. ,I 95,656 (Bd. of Govs., Fed. Res. Sys., April 4, 1972). 
158. CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. ,I 95,656. 
159. CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. ,I 95,656. See also 12 C.F.R. § 225.126(e) (1973), dis-
cussed in note 144 supra. 
160. 12 C.F.R. § 225.125 (1973). 
161. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C.). 
162. 401 U.S. 617 (1971). 
163. 12 C.F.R. § 225.125(£) (1973). 
164. 12 C.F.R. § 225.125(£) (1973). 
165. 12 C.F.R. § 225.125(£) (1973). 
166. 12 C.F.R. § 225.125(g) (1973). 
167. 12 C.F.R. § 225.125(h) (1973). 
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designed to avoid the danger, feared by the Supreme Court,168 that 
the public will associate the poor performance of an investment com-
pany associated with a bank with the soundness of the bank. 
"Portfolio investment advice," permitted under clause (iii), refers 
to advice on "the investment of funds in a 'security' as defined in 
section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. sec. 77a) or in 
real property interests, except where the real property is to be used 
in the trade or business of the person being advised . . . ."169 
Two Board decisions under clause (iv) have distinguished the 
providing of financial and economic information, which is permitted, 
from "management consulting," which is not.170 "Management con-
sulting" includes, but is not limited to, analysis and advice regarding 
a firm's purchasing, production, marketing, planning, personnel, 
internal, or research operations.171 Such advice, the Board found, 
could lead to serious conflicts of interest. If an affiliated bank should 
be a creditor of an advised company (a not unlikely situation), the 
advising company may be torn between advice that would best 
protect the bank's claim and advice that would be best for the 
client.172 The Board has applied this reasoning to one case in which 
the affiliated consulting firm's business was limited to advising banks 
and bank holding companies.173 However, when banks are the clients 
of the consulting firm, conflicts between the interests of the client 
and those of affiliated banks are much less likely to occur. Because 
of the unique guarantees insuring the stability of banks, loans from 
banks affiliated with the consulting firm are less likely to be in 
jeopardy and thus less likely to influence the firm's advice. The 
Board may feel that it is important to avoid potential conflicts of 
interest between the client banks and the affiliate banks, but if that 
is its position, it should be specified more clearly. 
The scope of clause (v), which permits advisory services to state 
and local governments, has yet to be defined. 
Under the sixth regulation a bank holding company can engage 
in the leasing of personalty only if "at the inception of the initial 
lease the expectation is that the effect of the transaction will be to 
compensate the lessor for not less than the lessor's full investment in 
168. 401 U.S. at 630-31. 
169. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(5)(iii) n.l (1973). The Board emphasized that the affiliate 
is to be regarded as acting in a fiduciary capacity in providing such advice. 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.4(a)(5)(iii) n.l (1973). 
170. Marine Midland Banks, Inc., 58 FED. REs. BULL. 676 (1972); First Commerce 
Corp., 58 FED. Rl:s. BuLL. 674 (1972). See also 12 C.F.R. § 225.126(£) (1973), discussed 
in note 144 mpra. 
171. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(5)(iv) n.2 (1973). 
172. First Commerce Corp., 58 FED. REs. BULL. 674, 675 (1972). 
173. Marine Midland Banks, Inc., 58 FED. REs. BuLL. 676 (1972). 
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the property."174 Interpretative problems have arisen most fre-
quently with respect to the phrase "full investment in the property." 
In general, leasing is permissible if it is "the functional equivalent 
of an extension of credit to the lessee."175 This condition has been 
found to exist if, at the time of the acquisition of the property by 
the lessor, there is a lease agreement that will yield a return from 
rentals, salvage value, and estimated tax benefits equivalent to the 
lessor's cost.176 A leasing operation is not disqualified by an otherwise 
nonqualifying lease with a municipal government lessee that cannot 
enter into a lease of more than one year's duration so long as there 
is a reasonable anticipation of renewals resulting in full compensa-
tion.177 Short-term "bridge" leasing, which fills a gap until per-
manent financing is arranged, is also allowed.178 In BankAmerica 
Corp.,179 the holding company argued that this regulation allowed 
the operation of a computer leasing subsidiary when "industrial 
experience" indicated that it could anticipate renewals of otherwise 
nonqualifying leases or future leases of the same equipment to 
other parties sufficient to return its investment. The Board held that 
this was not a permissible activity. It noted that the initial leases 
would not be on a "full payout" basis and that, given the rapid 
changes in computer technology, renewals were unlikely.180 The 
Board did not specifically deal with the claim that future leases of 
the same equipment would be sufficient to recoup the initial invest-
ment, thus leaving open the possibility that in a case involving a 
more stable industry it will consider "industrial experience" in 
determining if a lease is the functional equivalent of an extension of 
credit. 
The Board is currently considering a proposal that would revise 
the leasing paragraph to include real property.181 This would retain 
the requirement that the lease be the "functional equivalent of an 
extension of credit."182 In addition, it would incorporate the require-
ment, now found only in the interpretative rulings,183 that the lessor's 
return fully compensate him for his investment.184 
174. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(6) (1973). This provision is set out in the text accompany• 
ing note 150 supra. 
175. 12 C.F.R. § 225.123(d) (1973). 
176. 12 C.F.R. § 225.123(d) (1973). 
177. 12 C.F.R. § 225.123(d) (1973). 
178. 12 C.F.R. § 225.123(d) (1973). 
179. CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. ,I 95,716 (Bd. of Govs., Fed. Res. Sys., June 29, 
1972), petition for review filed, BankAmerica Corp. v. Board of Govs., No. 72-2325, 9th 
Cir., July 28, 1972. 
180. CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. ,I 95,716. The Board also found that the risk 
involved in the proposed activity meant that there were negative public benefits. 
181. Proposed Amendment to Reg. Y § 225.4(a)(6), 37 Fed. Reg. 26534 (1972). 
182. Id. § 225.4(a)(6)(i). 
183. 12 C.F.R. § 225.123{d) (1973). 
184. Proposed Amendment to Reg. Y § 225.4(a)(6)(iv), 37 Fed. Reg. 26534 (1972). In 
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The seventh regulation permits investment in activities "de-
signed primarily to improve community welfare."185 Under the 
Board's interpretation of this regulation, investments in community 
development corporations established pursuant to state or local laws 
are permissible,186 as are investments in low- and moderate-income 
housing that receive financial assistance or mortgage insurance from 
a governmental authority.187 To encourage flexibility in approaching 
social problems other permissible categories are only defined gen-
erally: 
(l) Projects for the construction or rehabilitation of housing for 
the benefit of persons of low- or moderate-income, (2) projects for 
the construction and rehabilitation of ancillary local commercial 
facilities necessary to provide goods or services principally to persons 
residing in low- or moderate-income housing, and (3) projects de-
signed explicitly to create improved job opportunities for low- or 
moderate-income groups .... 188 
In the one application considered under this regulation, the Board 
stressed that community welfare must be the main thrust of the 
project and not just a collateral effect.189 The application in that case 
was denied for that reason, even though the Board found that the 
office and commercial center proposed would stimulate the economy 
of the area in which it was to be constructed. In determining that 
community welfare was not the primary purpose of the project the 
Board examined the commercial nature of the venture and the 
expected rate of return on the investment. It noted that any com-
mercial enterprise would benefit the community in some way.100 
B. The Public Benefits Factors 
In addition to the "closely related" language discussed above, 
section 4(c)(8) provides: 
In determining whether a particular activity is a proper incident to 
banking or managing or controlling banks the Board shall consider 
whether its performance by an affiliate of a holding company can 
addition, the proposal would add the requirement that "[t]he property to be leased be 
acquired specifically for the leasing transaction under consideration." Id. § 225.4(a)(6)(ii). 
It would also provide time limits for disposing of the property when the lease expires 
(as soon as practical, maximum of two years), set the maximum term for a permissible 
lease (including renewals) at 20 years, and require that the lease be on a nonoperating 
basis. Id. §§ 225(a)(6)(v),(vi),(iii). 
185. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(7) (1973). This provision is set out in the text accompanying 
note 151 supra. 
186. 12 C.F.R. § 225.127(b) (1973). 
187. 12 C.F.R. § 225.I27(c) (1973). 
188. 12 C.F.R. § 225.127(d) (1973). 
189. R.I.H.T. Corp., 58 FED. R.Es. BULL. 595, 596 (1972). 
190. 58 FED. R.Es. BULL. at 596. The approach taken by this case was followed in 
the Board's interpretation of the regulation. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.I27(e) (1973). 
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reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public, such as 
greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency, 
that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as undue concentration 
of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interest, or 
unsound banking practices.101 
Of the five negative factors listed in the statute, only decreased 
competition in the line of business of the firm sought to be acquired 
has received much attention from the Board. In determining whether 
this danger exists the Board considers the effect of an acquisition on 
both present and potential competition. 
In determining whether present competition will be reduced the 
Board typically follows a three-step analysis. First, it specifies the 
particular market involved. The definitions of markets tend to be 
fairly narrow; the Board looks primarily to the particular product 
involved.192 
The Board also describes the market geographically. Its practice 
is to specify the area of overlapping services, 103 rather than to define 
a market area in the abstract. Although this specific approach is 
legitimate, as applied by the Board it may be overbroad and occa-
sionally produces misleading expressions of market shares. For 
example, a bank holding company and the company that it seeks to 
acquire may both operate throughout a state. Neither may have a 
significant share of the "state market," but they may both have a 
much larger share (or perhaps be the only competitors) in a smaller 
geographic area. The smaller market, in such a case, may be the most 
appropriate for determining the acquisition's impact on present 
competition.194 However, when the firm in question is in the business 
191. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1970). 
192. For example, mortgage banking is divided into tl1ree submarkets: residential, 
commercial, and construction. See, e.g., First Natl. Bancorporation, Inc., 58 Fro REs. 
BuLL. 597 (1972); First Tulsa Bancorporation, Inc., 58 Fro. REs. BULL. 317 (1972). Dis-
tinctions are also made between specialization in holding second mortgages and first 
mortgages, see, e.g., Dominion Bankshares Corp., 58 FEI>. REs. BuLL. 597 (1972), and 
in making mortgage loans for one's own account and for resale to institutional inves-
tors. See, e.g., Central Natl. Chicago Corp., 58 FED. REs. BuLL. 69 (1972). In addition, 
the Board has distinguished between classes of loans. See, e.g., First Bank Sys., Inc., 
58 FED. REs. BuLL. 172 (1972) (home improvement loans and oilier consumer loans); 
Bank of Va. Co., 58 FED. REs. BuLL. 934 (1972) (loans secured by used cars and less 
risky loans); Colorado Bankshares, Inc., 58 FED. REs. BULL. 422, 426 (1972) (loans to 
temporary residents and less risky loans). 
193. See, e.g., First Ark. Bankstock Corp., 59 FED. REs. BULL. 28 (1973). 
194. For an illustration of this difficulty, see Marine Bancorporation (Order Ap-
proving Retention of Coast Mortgage), 58 FED. REs. BuLL. 504, 505 (1972). The Board 
majority says tllat tlle combined proportion of mortgages originated by tlle holding 
company and tlle disputed subsidiary in a seven-county area of overlapping service is 
8.1 per cent. 58 FED. REs. BuLL. at 506. The dissenting statement of Governors Robert-
son and Sheehan argues tllat the appropriate market is a smaller unit (tlle Seattle 
area) and tllat togetller tlle companies originate 11.5 per cent of tlle mortgages in 
tllat area. 58 FED. REs. BULL. at 507. The minority view finds some support in United 
States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1964), in which the Court rejected 
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of placing loans with investors, it may be necessary to regard the ap-
propriate market as covering a large region, even the entire na-
tion.195 Typically, none of the companies will have a sufficient 
share of such a broad market to require an analysis of the competi-
tive effects of the acquisition.196 
The second step in evaluating the effect of the proposed acquisi-
tion on present competition is the determination of the share of the 
market held by the holding company and the share held by the 
company to be acquired. Three applications to acquire mortgage 
companies that were denied solely on the basis of loss of present 
competition197 indicate what the Board considers to be an excessive 
share of the market. The combined shares of the holding company 
system and the proposed subsidiary were, respectively, 20 per cent 
of mortgages in the Spokane market, 198 11.8 per cent of the one-to-
four-family residential mortgage market in Tulsa,199 and 13.6 per 
cent of the one-to-four-family residential market in the Augusta, 
Georgia, area.20° From these decisions and others approving acqui-
sitions it appears that, as the market share after acquisition ap-
proaches 10 per cent,2°1 the Board regards the loss of competition as 
a lower court finding that the appropriate market for two merging banks was the 
entire northeastern part of the United States. In doing so, the Court stated: "The 
proper question to be asked in this case is not where the parties to the merger do 
business or even where they compete, but where, within the area of competitive over-
lap, the effect of the merger will be direct and immediate." 374 U.S. at 357. 
195. See, e.g., First R.R. & Banking Co., 59 FED. R.Es. BULL, 25, 26 (1973) (mortgage 
servicing). 
196. See, e.g., First R.R. & Banking Co., 59 FED. R.Es. BULL. 25, 26 (1973). The only 
case in which a national market has been analyzed is Provident Natl. Corp., 58 
FED. R.Es. BULL. 933 (1972), in which the Board approved the acquisition of a lease 
financing company that had less than a one per cent share of the national market for 
equipment leasing. 
197. First R.R. & Banking Co., 59 FED. R.Es. BULL. 25 (1973); First Tulsa Bancorpora-
tion, 58 FED. R.Es. BULL. 317 (1972); U.S. Bancorp, 58 FED. R.Es. BULL. 177 (1972). 
198. U.S. Bancorp, 58 FED. R.Es. BuLL. 177, 178 n.4 (1972). 
199. First Tulsa Bancorporation, 58 FED. R.Es. BuLL. 317, 318 (1972). 
200. First R.R. & Banking Co., 59 FED. R.Es. BuLL. 25, 26 (1973). In this case the 
combined share of the construction loan market was 13.5 per cent. 
201. In Marine Bancorporation, 58 FED. R.Es. BULL. 505, 506 (1972), the Board said 
that an 8.1 per cent market share was serious but approved the application. The dis-
senters argued that the share was actually 11.5 per cent. See text accompanying notes 
237-42 infra for a more detailed treatment of this case. 
The Board's approach can be compared with court decisions in cases arising under 
similar language in section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), and in the 
Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1970). 
The Clayton Act proscribes mergers or acquisitions "where in any line of commerce 
in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to les-
sen competition or to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 {1970). 
In United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), there were thousands of 
small firms in the Los Angeles retail food business, the market in question. The Court 
found congressional intent to promote such enterprises in the 1950 amendments to the 
Clayton Act (Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125). 384 U.S. at 276-77. It con-
cluded that creation of one firm with a 7.5 per cent market share (which would have 
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significant. Within a fairly wide range around that figure, approval 
may be granted if appropriate mitigating factors are found. 
In the third step of its analysis, the Board investigates any such 
mitigating features. For example, if the proposed subsidiary itself 
has only a small share of the present market, the Board will look 
more favorably upon its acquisition, even if the total market share of 
the subsidiary and the holding company system combined is consid-
erable. In such situations the acquired company is presumably not 
a significant competitive force.202 The Board may also consider in 
mitigation the degree of concentration in a market. If there are 
many competitors in a market, none of which have a particularly 
large share, acquisitions are more likely to be approved on the theory 
that the existing competition is adequate and will continue after the 
acquisition.203 In one such case the Board approved an acquisition 
made it the second largest firm in the market) would contribute to the elimination of 
the small stores and was therefore impermissible. 
The Clayton Act does not require the balancing of adverse effects with potential 
benefits. The Bank Merger Act, however, does provide for such a procedure: 
(5) The responsible agency shall not approve- . • . (B) any other proposed 
merger transaction whose effect in any section of the country may be substantially 
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or which in any other man-
ner would be in restraint of trade, unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects 
of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the 
probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the com-
munity to be served. 
12 U.S.C § 1828(c)(5)(:B) (1970). The same standard is to be applied by reviewing courts. 
12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(B) (1970). Actions challenging proposed mergers are still brought 
under the antitrust laws; however, a finding that a substantial decrease in competition is 
possible will not necessarily prevent the merger if the anticompetitive effects are clearly 
outweighed by its benefits in meeting the convenience and needs of the community. See 
United States v. First City Natl. Bank, 386 U.S. 361 (1967). 
The approach followed by the Board under the Bank Holding Company Act seems 
consistent with the Supreme Court's application of the Bank Merger Act. It should be 
noted that the provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act governing the acquisition 
of banks by holding companies are identical to those found in the Bank Merger Act. 
See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1970). See also 12 U.S.C. § 1849(b) (1970). The Board has ap-
plied the market-shares doctrine quite strictly, perhaps in consideration of Congress' de-
sire to use the Bank Holding Company Act to stimulate competition and encourage de 
novo entries. See House Managers' Statement, supra note 75, at 17-18. 
202. E.g., American Fletcher Corp., 38 Fed. Reg. 14202 (1973); First Chicago Corp., 
58 FED. RES. :BULL. 175 (1972). This reasoning has its limits, however. In Security Natl. 
Corp., 38 Fed. Reg. 12259 (1973), the holding company's subsidiary bank controlled 45 
per cent of the auto loans in the Sioux City, Iowa, market. The Board denied an ap-
plication to acquire a fairly small finance company that also made auto loans. The 
Board did not mention the precise market share of the proposed acquisition. 
203. E.g., First Chicago Corp., 58 FED. RES. :BuLL. 175, 176 (1972). In certain markets 
this reasoning would be unsatisfactory, for it would permit eventual elimination of 
small firms. (While no single small company would be a significant force, the presence 
of a large number of small firms may be important. Cf. United States v. Von's Grocery 
Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1960), discussed in note 201 supra.) However, in response to a similar 
argument raised in a hearing on an application for a merger of two bank holding 
companies under section 3(a)(5) of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(5) 
(1970), the Board refused to consider such long-range possibilities. Each application, it 
said, is to "be analyzed on the basis of the ••• facts existing at the time of Board con-
sideration." First Fla. :Bancorporation, 59 FED. RES. BULL. 183, 184 (1973). 
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that resulted in a combined market share of 12.5 per cent because 
there were many other competitors in the market, several of which 
were large national firms.204 On the other hand, where a few large 
companies dominate the market, the Board may still approve an 
acquisition if the holding company and the proposed subsidiary are 
not major factors in order to enable the subsidiary to compete more 
effectively with the dominant firms.205 
The Board has been concerned about loss of potential competi-
tion, as well as present competition. If the holding company is 
capable of entering a market directly or by opening a new subsidiary, 
its entry by acquisition of an existing business is regarded as un-
desirable. Therefore, in ruling on an application, the Board exam-
ines the holding company's capacity to enter the proposed sub-
sidiary's business on a de novo basis, considering such factors as skill, 
capital, contacts in the business, and the legality of the entry. 
Firms doing a substantial business in one segment of the mort-
gage banking field, for example, are considered capable of expand-
ing into other submarkets,206 and a bank holding company with a 
mortgage company subsidiary is regarded as better able to enter a 
new geographic market of the mortgage banking business than a 
holding company without such a subsidiary.207 On the other hand, 
the skill barrier has been regarded as too great to make bank hold-
ing companies likely entrants into such specialized businesses as 
factoring.208 A legal bar to de novo entry has been an important fac-
tor in cases involving applications to acquire finance companies that 
specialize in second mortgages.209 The Board has approved such ap-
plications, concluding that, since federal law requires that real estate 
loans by national banks be secured by first liens,210 the national bank 
subsidiaries of the holding companies are unlikely to enter the 
market in the future. This analysis is faulty, however, in that it is the 
ability of the holding company (directly or through a subsidiary) 
to enter into competition with the finance company that must be 
evaluated, not the ability of a particular bank subsidiary to do so. 
Once the Board finds that the holding company applicant has the 
204. First Ark. Bankstock Corp., 59 FED. R.Es. BULL, 28, 29 (1973). In First Pa. Corp., 
38 Fed. Reg. 917 (1973), the Board allowed acquisition of a finance company that led to 
a combined market share of nearly nine per cent of the small consumer loan business in 
the Houma, Louisiana, market because there were over 30 other competing firms, many 
potential entrants, and relative ease of entry. 
205. E.g., Boatmen's Bankshares, Inc., 58 FED. R.Es. BULL. 427, 427-28 (1972); N.B.C. 
Co., 37 Fed. Reg. 24792, 24793 (1972). 
206. E.g., BTNB Corp., 58 FED. R.Es. BULL. 70, 71 (1972). 
207. E.g., Marine Bancorporation, 58 FED. R.Es. BULL. 504, 505 (1972). 
208. Provident Natl. Corp., 58 FED. R.Es. BULL. 936, 937 (1972). 
209. E.g., Guaranty Loan &: Inv. Corp., 58 FED. R.Es. BuLL. 738, 738-39 (1972). 
210. 12 U.S.C. § 371 (1970). See 12 C.F.R. § 7.2IO0(b)(3) (1973). 
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capacity to make a de novo entry into the market served by the 
potential subsidiary it next determines if circumstances obviate the 
undesirable loss of potential competition that would result. For 
example, in some cases the Board has found that the holding 
company, although capable of a de novo entry, is unlikely to enter 
the market de novo;211 consequently, little would be lost by permit-
ting an acquisition and thus removing all possibility of a future entry 
by the holding company. In other cases, the Board has concluded 
that the proposed subsidiary is so small that its acquisition would 
have an impact equivalent to a de novo entry.212 The loss of potential 
competition may also be obviated by the existence of many other 
potential entrants;213 in such a case the loss of one may not be too 
serious. Acquisitions by holding companies capable of de novo entry 
have also been approved when a large number of firms are already 
competing in the market.214 Presumably, the loss of potential com-
petition is less important where the market is already highly com-
petitive. 
The four other potential adverse effects to be weighed in assess-
ing net public benefits have not been as important in Board decisions 
as the possibility of decreased competition. Of these, the most empha-
sis has been placed on concentration of resources. However, the 
Board has failed to provide any clear standards as to what constitutes 
an undesirable concentration.215 The decision in Crocker National 
211. E.g., First Bank Sys., Inc., 58 FED. REs. BULL. 502 (1972). 
212. E.g., First Chicago Corp., 58 FED. REs. BULL, 175 (1972) (second largest Chicago 
banking organization-deposits of 4.6 billion dollars-allowed to acquire mortgage com-
pany with a loan portfolio of 97.5 million dollars--0.7 per cent of market). See also 
First Natl. City Corp., 59 FED. REs. BULL. 27 (1973) (second largest U.S. banking orga-
nization-deposits of 13.85 billion dollars-allowed to acquire consumer finance firm 
with assets of 31 million dollars). 
213. E.g., First Natl. Holding Corp., 58 FED. REs. BuLL. 502, 502 (1972). See also 
First Natl. Union Corp., 58 FED. REs. BuLL. 72 (1972) (company controlling nation's 
ninth largest mortgage company allowed to acquire largest mortgage banking firm in 
Mississippi although mortgage company was operating only one state removed from 
Mississippi, because other firms were capable of entering market). 
214. E.g., First Chicago Corp., 58 FED. REs. BULL. 175, 176 (1972). See also NCNB 
Corp., 58 FED. RES. BuLL. 844 (1972) (North Carolina holding company owning mortgage 
company and state's second largest bank allowed to acquire largest mortgage banking 
firm in South Carolina because many other competing firms existed in South Carolina). 
The Board's willingness to approve acquisitions that apparently reduce potential 
competition is analogous to the reluctance of the courts to interfere with bank mergers 
because of loss of potential competition. See, e.g., United States v. First Natl. Bancor-
poration, 379 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Colo. 1971), afjd. by an equally divided court, 41 
U.S.L.W. 4358 (U.S., Feb. 28, 1973). 
215. In BTNB Corp., 58 FED. REs. BULL. 70 (1972), the bank holding company con-
trolled 25 per cent of the bank deposits in the Birmingham, Alabama, area, and the 
proposed acquisition, the 20th largest mortgage company in the United States, had total 
assets of 632 million dollars (234 million of which were in the Birmingham area). The 
Board rejected the acquisition application because "the proposed acquisition is one that 
would eliminate potential competition." 58 FED. REs. BULL. at 71. In addition, the 
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Corp.216 suggests that this may be due to a Board split on the question 
of whether the absolute size of a company or its size relative to the 
market is the critical factor. In that case, three of the £our members of 
the Board majority said that the concentration of 6 billion dollars in 
assets and 877 million dollars in mortgage servicing portfolios in a 
California bank holding company was too great.217 However, the other 
member of the majority concurred in denying the application only on 
the ground of loss of potential competition.218 The three dissenting 
governors concluded that there was no significant concentration 
when the size of the market (California) was considered.219 
The other three adverse factors have been largely ignored by the 
Board.220 At least one of these, unfair competition,221 deserves more 
attention, especially with regard to the possibility that credit from 
bank subsidiaries of the holding company will become less available 
to the competitors of the nonbank business that the holding com-
pany wishes to acquire. For example, in United Jersey Banks,222 the 
Board approved the acquisition of a New York City commercial 
finance company even though the largest bank in the holding com-
pany system supplied credit to several of the finance company's com-
petitors. The Board found that the danger of unfair competition was 
negligible £or two reasons: First, the acquired company was a very 
weak competitor in a large financial market.223 Second, the availabil-
Board stated that it was "concerned also about the concentration of economic resources" 
that would result. 58 Fm. RE.s. BULL. at 71. 
216. 58 FED. RE.s. BULL. 419 (1972). 
217. 58. FED. RE.s. BULL. at 420. 
218. 58 FED. RES. BULL. at 420-21 (Burns, Chm., concurring). 
219. 58 Fm. RE.s. BULL. at 421-22 (Mitchell, Daane, &: Sheehan, Govs., dissenting). 
220. Unsound banking, conflicts of interest, and unfair competition are the other 
three factors. Neither unsound banking nor conflicts of interest problems have been dis-
cussed by the Board in considering the public benefits that would result from an acqui-
sition. The only mention of these factors is in paragraphs summarily listing nonexistant 
potential harmful effects. See, e.g., Guaranty Loan &: Inv. Corp., 58 FED. RE.s. BuLL. 738, 
739 (1972); Dacotah Bank Holding Co., 58 Fm. RE.s. BULL. 740 (1972). 
However, conflicts of interest problems were discussed in connection with the deter-
mination as to whether management consulting was closely related to banking. See text 
accompanying notes 170-73 supra. Fear of unsound banking practices seems to have 
been important in the determinations that computer leasing, see text accompanying 
notes 179-80 supra, and real estate syndication, see text accompanying notes 157-59 
supra, were not closely related to banking. 
221. The conference report lists as examples: "(a) intimidation of customers to cause 
them to refrain from buying a competitor's products; (b) commercial espionage ••• ; 
(c) inducing breach of contract; (d) enticing away competitor's employees in order to 
cripple his business; (e) price discrimination; (f) selling a service below cost ••• in order 
to obtain a business for another subsidiary; (g) harassing practices .•• .'' House Man-
agers' Statement, supra note 75, at 19. 
222. 37 Fed. Reg. 23384 (1972). See also Provident Natl. Corp., 58 FED. RE.s. BULL. 
933 (1972). 
223. The acquired firm's assets were less than three per cent of those of its largest 
competitor. See 37 Fed. Reg. at 23384. 
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ity of many alternative sources of credit made it unlikely that com-
petitors would be deprived of funds as a result of the acquisition. 
However, this analysis ignores the possibility that the other potential 
credit suppliers may also be affiliated with commercial finance 
companies.224 In that case, obtaining credit from them would not be 
a realistic alternative. Moreover, the Board did not consider whether, 
if the subsidiary bank continued to make loans to the competitors of 
its affiliates, there was any danger of misuse of confidential credit 
information.225 
Even when banks presently affiliated with the holding company 
have made no loans to the competitors of their nonbank affiliates, 
the decreased availability of credit may be a problem in the long run. 
If operating a nonbanking subsidiary within a holding company 
system has advantages, such as bringing more customers into the 
bank or reducing the costs of the nonbank subsidiary (as, for exam-
ple, by reducing the cost of credit), other banks in the market and 
unaffiliated nonbank businesses will feel competitive pressures to 
join bank holding companies or create such systems themselves.226 
Accelerating this process is the tendency of banks in a given market 
to keep in step with each other in expanding into nonbanking 
lines.227 At some point the remaining independent nonbank busi-
nesses may be left without banking institutions that are not affiliated 
with their competitors,228 and the diminished availability of credit 
will became apparent.229 Considerable foresight is required to avoid 
this problem. Otherwise, the Board may be compelled to cease ap-
proving all applications submitted after the danger has become clear. 
This would perpetuate the advantaged position of those holding 
companies who submitted their applications first, even though others 
may be more deserving of approval. However, the Board's only 
alternative in such a situation would be to revoke previous approv-
224. As of Dec. 31, 1971, 89 per cent of New York's commercial bank deposits were 
in banks affiliated with holding companies, FED. REs. BULL., Aug. 1972, at AIOI, and at 
least some of these holding companies were engaged in commercial financing through 
subsidiaries. See, e.g., Lincoln First Banks, Inc., 58 FED. RES. BULL. 169 (1972); 1969 
HousE REPORT, supra note 56, at 28 (individual views of Chairman Patman). 
225. See House Managers' Statement, supra note 75, at 19. 
226. See American Fletcher Corp., 58 FED. REs. BuLL. 741, 742 (1972) (Robertson & 
Brimmer, Govs., dissenting). 
227. G. Hall, Anticompetitive Impacts of Expanded Bank Service Lines 12 (1971) 
(RAND Corp. Doc. No. P4594). See also NCNB Corp., 58 FED. REs. BuLL. 844, 847 (1972) 
(Robertson &: Brimmer, Govs., dissenting); American Fletcher Corp., 58 FED. REs. BULL. 
741, 742 (1972) (Robertson &: Brimmer, Govs., dissenting). 
228. 1969 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 811 (statement of Peter H. Grimes, Pres., 
Assn. of Retail Travel Agents). 
229. ld. See also G. Hall, supra note 227, at 21; note 203 supra. 
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als.230 This is hardly a desirable solution given congressional concern 
over the hardships caused by divestiture.231 
Once the Board has determined that these potential adverse 
effects exist, the language of section 4(c)(8) requires it to see if these 
negative factors are outweighed by any positive effects. The types 
of benefits that the Board has accepted as indicating that an acqui-
sition may be justified include an expansion of the acquired 
company's activities made possible by the availability of more 
resources, 232 an increase in the lines of service of a new or old 
subsidiary,233 an increase in competition with the dominant firms in 
a market,234 and the making of funds available to the subsidiary at 
lower cost.235 
However, the Board has seldom found that the benefits in a given 
case overcome the adverse effects. Although in each approval the 
Board briefly indicates the possible public benefits,236 Marine Ban-
corporation231 is the only decision in which benefits have tipped the 
balance in the face of serious adverse effects. In that case, in which 
the bank holding company asked to retain a mortgage company 
subsidiary, the Board found that the competitive factors taken alone 
would have justified rejection238 but that the benefits that could 
230. Unlike the grandfather clause, section 4(c)(8) contains no provision for termi-
nating a holding company's rights to engage in nonbanking activities after initial ap• 
proval. Instead, the Board's authority to terminate, as in the case of section 4(d) ex-
emptions, see note 70 supra, is based on a reservation of such a power in the order ap-
proving the applications. See, e.g., First Va. Bankshares Corp., 59 FED. REs. Buu.. 202, 
203 (1973): "This determination is subject ••• to the Board's authority to require such 
modification or termination of the activities ... as the Board finds necessary to assure 
compliance with the provisions and purposes of the Act and the Board's regulations 
and orders issued thereunder •.•• " 
231. Such concern is shown by the congressional decision to allow companies which 
became bank holding companies as a result of the 1970 amendments up to ten years 
to dispose of their unauthorized holdings. Bank Holding Company Act § 4(a)(2), 12 
U.S.C. § I843(a)(2) (1970). 
232. Mountain Banks, Ltd., 58 FED. REs. Buu.. 316, 317 (1972); Industrial Natl. 
Corp., 58 FED. REs. Buu.. 171, 172 (1972). 
233. Marine Bancorporation, 58 FED. REs. BULL. 504, 506 (1972); Lincoln First Banks, 
Inc., 58 FED. REs. BULL. 169, 170 (1972). 
234. NCNB Corp., 58 FED. REs. BULL. 844, 848 (1972); Patagonia Corp., 58 FED. REs. 
Buu.. 170, 171 (1972). 
235. Provident Natl. Corp., 58 FED. REs. BULL. 936, 937 (1972); Provident Natl. Corp., 
58 FED. REs. Bou.. 933 (1972). 
236. See, e.g., Bank of Va. Co., 58 FED. REs. BULL. 934, 934-35 (1972): "Approval of 
eacl1 acquisition will make available to Richmond Finance Corporation and Hanover 
the financial resources of Applicant and enable both companies to better serve their 
customers and provide more effective competition to their competitors in the market 
area. The resulting benefits in terms of public needs and convenience, and increased 
competition would, in the Board's judgment, outweigh any possible adverse effect on 
competition." 
237. 58 FED. REs. Buu.. 504 (1972). 
238. 58 FED. REs. Buu.. at 506. The company had originated 4.7 per cent of the 
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have been anticipated and that were actually produced since the 
acquisition overcame these undesirable effects. These benefits had 
resulted from the depressed conditions in the Seattle area at the time 
of the acquisition (1968). As the Board explained, affiliation im-
proved 
Coast's [the acquired subsidiary's] ability to accept from financially 
distressed builders and other mortgage debtors land and other im-
provements for orderly liquidation, thereby preventing foreclosure, 
forced sales and deficiency judgments which would, in most cases, 
have resulted in financial disaster to the mortgage debtors. Another 
reasonable expectation, and proven fact, was that the affiliation 
would also improve the ability of Coast to expand the scope of its 
mortgage lending and expand its services into new lines, such as col-
lege housing and public housing projects for minority, elderly, and 
low-income groups.2so 
This approach raises some interesting questions regarding the equal-
ity of treatment between applicants that seek to retain an existing 
affiliate and those that seek to acquire a new enterprise.240 The 
former may have tangible benefits to show to the Board, while the 
latter can present at the most only promises and predictions. In 
Marine Bancorporation, the Board, after listing the "proven facts," 
concluded that, "these potential public benefits outweigh the adverse 
effect on competition resulting from the affiliation."241 However, as 
the two dissenting governors suggest,242 it is difficult to believe that 
the majority disregarded the actual post-acquisition benefits. 
The balancing analysis required by the "public benefits" lan-
guage cannot be made on a categorical basis, 243 for the Board must 
determine which of the listed positive and negative factors poten-
tially exist in a given case before it can weigh them against each 
other, and the presence of most of the adverse factors listed in the 
mortgages in the Seattle market, and Coast Mortgage (the acquired subsidiary) had 
originated 6.8 per cent. 58 FED. REs. BuLL. at 507 (Robertson &: Sheehan, Govs., dis-
senting). Compare this with the discussion of excessive market shares in te.-..:t accompany-
ing notes 198-200 supra. 
239. 58 FED. REs. BULL. at 506. 
240. In order to retain its interest in a subsidiary acquired after June 30, 1968, a 
bank holding company must go through the same application procedures as those seek-
ing approval of acquisitions of new subsidiaries. Bank Holding Company Act § 4(a)(2), 
12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (1970), 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a) (1973). Bank holding companies that 
acquired subsidiaries before June 30, 1968, may be eligible for grandfather privileges. 
See text accompanying notes 74-123 supra. 
241. 58 FED. REs. BuLL. at 506 (emphasis added). 
242. 58 FED. REs. BULL. at 507-08 (Robertson&: Sheehan, Govs., dissenting). 
243. The Board has made one attempt to define a public benefit. In 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.4(a)(l0) n.3 (1973), the Board indicates it will normally approve applications by 
holding companies seeking to undenvrite credit insurance only on a showing that ap-
proval would reduce rates (or increase benefits). See note 154 supra and accompanying 
text. 
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statute can only be determined in the context of a particular appli-
cation. For example, in order to determine whether the entry of a 
given bank holding company into a certain type of activity will 
increase or decrease competition, the Board must consider, among 
other things, whether the entry is de novo or by acquisition, the 
size of the firm acquired, and the competitive structure of the mar-
ket. Similarly, whether undue concentration of resources will result 
depends not so much on the type of activity, as on the relative eco-
nomic power and size of the resulting bank holding company system. 
Since it cannot be said that a given type of activity will invariably 
produce net benefits or net harm, regulations of general scope, such 
as those issued under the "closely related" language, will not be of 
much help in applying the "public benefits" language. Instead, the 
Board must make case-by-case determinations. 
C. Relationship Between the "Closely Related" Language 
and the "Public Benefits" Language 
The congressional intent underlying the 1970 amendments may 
shed some further light on the purpose of section 4(c)(8) and, specifi-
cally, the relationship between the "closely related" requirement 
and the "public benefits" requirement. Prior to the 1970 amend-
ments, section 4(c) provided: 
The prohibitions in this section . . . shall not, with respect to any 
other bank holding company, apply to-
(8) shares of any company all the activities of which are or are 
to be of a financial, fiduciary, or insurance nature and which the 
Board after due notice and hearing, and on the basis of the rec-
ord made at such hearing, by order has determined to be so 
closely related to the business of banking or of managing or con-
trolling banks as to be a proper incident thereto .... 244 
The Federal Reserve Board interpreted this section to require "a 
direct and significant connection between the proposed activities of 
the company to be acquired and the business of banking, or of 
managing and controlling banks, as conducted by the bank holding 
company or its banking subsidiaries."245 It was not sufficient, in the 
Board's view, that the activities of the proposed subsidiary were 
very similar to those conducted by banks generally.246 There had to 
be a "direct functional integration" of the activities of the proposed 
244. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 4(c)(6), 70 Stat. 137, redesignated 
section 4(c)(8) by Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 8(b), 80 Stat. 269. This pro-
vision did not include any language concerning public benefits. 
245. 1969 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 199 (statement of Federal Reserve Board 
Chairman Martin) (emphasis added). 
246. General Contract Corp., 44 FED. REs. Buu. 260 (1958). 
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subsidiary with those of the specific bank holding company making 
the application.247 
The 1970 Amendments made two major changes in section 
4(c)(8).248 The first was to delete the words "business of," preceding 
the phrase "banking or managing or controlling banks." One effect 
of this change seems clear: The Board is no longer to require a direct 
connection between the business of the proposed subsidiary and that 
of the bank member of the holding company. Henceforth, such 
business need only be related to banking generally.249 
The second major change was to add the "public benefits" lan-
guage described above.250 There is disagreement over whether this 
language introduces a requirement separate from the "closely re-
lated to banking" language. If so, a proposed activity must meet the 
old "closely related to banking" test (as modified) and, in addition, 
meet a "public benefits" test. If not, the Board is to determine 
whether a proposed activity is closely related to banking principally 
on the basis of the public benefits or detriments it would produce. 
The second, one-test, interpretation was favored by those who 
wanted the 1970 amendments to expand the scope of permissible 
bank holding company activity. The proponents of such expansion 
originally attempted to eliminate the "closely related" language 
and substitute an exemption for activities "functionally related to 
banking in such a way that their performance by an affiliate of a bank 
holding company can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to 
the public that outweigh possible adverse effects .... "251 Both houses 
initially adopted versions of the bill containing such "functionally 
related" language, although the House bill also contained a list of 
activities that bank holding companies were prohibited from carry-
ing on.252 The conference committee agreed to retain the "closely 
related" language and delete the House's prohibitions. 
The members of the committee split sharply over the proper 
247. General Contract Corp., 44 Fm. R.Es. BuLL. 260, 278 (1958). The Board did find 
that operation of an insurance agency could be closely related to banking. See Otto 
Bremer Co., 47 FED. R.Es. BULL. 1039 (1961) (close historical, physical, and personnel 
relationships between bank and insurance agency). See also St. Joseph Agency, 47 FED. 
RES. BULL. 290 (1961); First Bank Stock Corp., 45 FED. R.Es. BULL. 917 (1959). 
248. Several other minor changes were also made. See House Managers' Statement, 
supra note 75, at 14-16. 
249. Id. at 16; Senate Managers' Statement, supra note 75, at 42424. 
250. See text accompanying note 191 supra. 
251. H.R. 6778, § 103(4), reported by the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, Aug. 10, 1970, in CCH FED. BANKING L. REP., Special Report No. 306, at 20, Aug. 
14, 1970. 
252. H.R. 6778, § 1(£), passed by the House of Representatives, Nov. 5, 1969, in 
1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at Ill, 116-19 (selling securities or insurance, pro-
viding travel, auditing or data processing services, and leasing property). The version 
of the Act originally passed by the Senate also contained the "functionally related" 
language. House Managers' Statement, supra note 75, at 13. 
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interpretation to be given this action. The majority (four of seven) 
of the House conferees argued that the retention of the old "closely 
related" language meant that the attempts to expand the scope of 
permissible activities had been rejected.253 The new "public bene-
fits" language, they felt, merely added another test, further restrict-
ing the activities in which bank holding companies could engage. 
The Senate conferees disagreed: 
It [the bill] frees the Board of the restrictive precedents estab-
lished under the present act .... Furthermore, it defines "a proper 
incident" to banking in very broad terms of various benefits to the 
public as opposed to possible adverse effects.254 
The House managers' statement regarding the meaning of sec-
tion 4(c)(8) is in my opinion a misconstruction of fact. It is hard for 
me to conceive of any way that an objective person present at the 
conference could interpret section 4( c)(8) as was done in that state-
ment.255 
[Section 4(c)(8) as amended] retains [from the original Senate bill] 
maximum flexibility for the Federal Reserve Board to determine the 
activities in which a bank holding company and its subsidiaries may 
engage.256 
Since the conferees disagree so dramatically, it is necessary to 
look elsewhere to determine what was meant by this particular pro-
vision. Perhaps most helpful is the drafting history of the conference 
bill. At the conference the House conferees proposed exemption 
for activities that are "so closely related to [the business of] banking 
or [of] managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident 
thereto and can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the 
public ... ,"257 When asked to comment on the above language, 
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Arthur F. Burns expressed his 
concern that it implied that the "public benefits" provision was to 
be a separate test. To avoid this implication he suggested that the 
word "and" be deleted and that the sentence "In determining 
whether a particular activity is a proper incident to banking ... the 
Board shall consider . . . [the net public benefits]" be substituted 
for the last phrase.258 Since the final version of the bill embodied 
253. House Managers' Statement, supra note 75, at 19-22. 
254. Senate Managers' Statement, supra note 75, at 42424. 
255. ll6 CONG. R.Ec. 42432 (1970) (remarks of Senator Bennett). 
256. Id. 
257. Letter from Wright Patman to Arthur F. Burns, Nov. 19, 1970, in Senate Man-
agers' Statement, supra note 75, at 42423 (emphasis added). 
258. Letter from Arthur F. Burns to Wright Patman, Nov. 23, 1970, in Senate Man-
agers' Statement, supra note 75, at 42423. Mr. Bums also suggested the deletion of 
language bracketed in the House conferees' proposal. See text accompanying notes 248-
49 supra. 
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this change, it would seem that the "public benefits" provision is 
not a separate and distinct test. 
The one-test interpretation finds further support in the fact 
that Mr. Burns supported an approach with two tests-the "closely 
related" test and a "proper incident to banking" test. (The public 
benefits provision would apply only to the latter test under his for-
mulation.) To effectuate this result, he suggested changing the 
words "as to be" to "and are."259 The fact that this change was not 
adopted is another indication that the present language, unlike the 
House conferees' proposal or Burns' proposal, provides only one 
test-"so closely related to banking ... as to be a proper incident 
thereto"-with the public benefits language to be used in deter-
mining whether an activity is properly incident to banking. 
Under this interpretation the discretion of the Federal Reserve 
Board in determining what nonbank activities are permissible is 
greatly expanded. The House conferees' view of the changes made 
by the amendments is too restrictive. Looking behind their state-
ments to the actual drafting process there appears to be essentially 
one test. In most cases, when evaluating an activity under this test, 
the Board is to look to whether it will produce net public benefits. 
The "closely related" language retained from the earlier provision 
does have a limited function in and of itself: It serves as an initial 
check on activities that are clearly not related to banking, such as 
operating a railroad or auto repair shop. Such activities would not 
be permitted even if it could be demonstrated that they would pro-
duce net benefits. However, if an activity could be considered re-
lated to banking in any way, the Board must look primarily to public 
benefit factors. This analysis suggests that the role of the regulations 
defining what is "closely related" will be somewhat limited. The 
more difficult cases will be decided in the context of particular fact 
situations, for that is where public benefits can be best evaluated. 
This has, in fact, been the approach adopted by the Board. Close 
analysis indicates that the list of activities in the regulations was 
never intended to be a definitive guide as to whether a particular 
entry will be permitted. The Board has in no way restricted its ap-
provals to the listed activities. For example, the Board has approved 
the proposed operation of a "pooled reserve" plan260 for banks 
through a nonbank subsidiary of a holding company, even though 
259. Letter from Arthur F. Burns to Wright Patman, Nov. 23, 1970, in Senate Man-
agers' Statement, supra note 75, at 42423. 
260. Citizens & S. Natl. Bank and Citizens &: S. Holding Co., 57 FED. REs. BULL. 1037 
(1971). A "pooled reserve" plan is "a method of pooling of loss reserves with respect to 
term loans to small businesses and the establishment of uniform credit standards with 
respect thereto, thus permitting banks • • • to adopt a uniform and liberal credit 
policy in extending credit and eliminating the usual method of exchanging participa-
tions between these banks." 57 FED. RES. BULL. at 1038. 
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this activity was not covered by the Board's regulations. As the hear-
ing examiner, whose findings and conclusions were adopted by the 
Board, said, "the listing of the categories does not preclude the exis-
tence of other activities which might be shown to meet the test of 
section 4(c)(8)."261 The relevant factors in determining that such an 
activity was permitted under section 4(c)(8) were its similarity to 
the established practice of loan participation benveen banks and the 
hope that it would produce public benefits by improving the capacity 
of small member banks to make commercial loans.262 
In two other decisions,263 a peculiar legal situation led the Board 
to approve the operation of savings and loan associations, explicitly 
excluded from the regulations, 264 in the interest of promoting fairer 
and increased competition. Rhode Island law allows mutual savings 
banks and certain credit unions to offer checking accounts through 
commercial bank subsidiaries,265 thus giving the competitors of the 
applicant's bank subsidiaries the power to combine these opera-
tions.266 The Board permitted Rhode Island bank holding companies 
to operate both a savings and loan association and a commercial 
bank in order to equalize their competitive position vis-a-vis other fi-
nancial institutions. Finally, in a number of cases the Board has con-
cluded that activities are not closely related to banking because the 
adverse effects outweighed the benefits.267 
Thus, the Board has taken a flexible and expansive approach to 
the application of section 4(c)(8).268 First, it appears that the Board 
261. Citizens &: S. Natl. Bank and Citizens &: S. Holding Co., 57 FED. REs. BULL. 1037, 
1041 (1971). 
262. Citizens &: S. Natl. Bank and Citizens &: S. Holding Co., 57 FED. REs. BULL. 1037, 
1041 (1971). 
263. Old Colony Cooperative Bank, 58 FED. REs. BULL. 417 (1972); Newport Sav. &: 
Loan Assn., 58 FED. REs. BULL. 313 (1972). 
264. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(l) n.• (1973). The Board had not yet adopted 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.126(h) (1973), which includes operation of savings and loan associations in the 
category of activities found not closely related to banking. When the Board issued that 
ruling, it emphasized that it did not affect the Rhode Island decisions. 58 FED. REs. 
BULL. 717 (1972). 
265. R.I. GEN. l.Aws ANN. § 19-9-7 (Supp. 1972) (savings banks); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. 
§ 19-21-9.1 (Supp. 1972) (credit unions with assets of more than one million dollars). 
266. Most Rhode Island mutual savings banks (savings and loan associations) had 
acquired their commercial bank subsidiaries before December 31, 1970, and were there-
fore exempted from the provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act by section 
2(a)(5)(F), 12 U.S.C. § 184l(a)(5)(F) (1970). See Newport Sav. &: Loan Assn., 58 FED. REs. 
BULL. 313, 314 n.l (1972). 
267. See, e.g., BankAmerica Corp., CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. 1J 95,716 (Bd. of Govs., 
Fed. Res. Sys., June 29, 1972) (unsound banking practices); First Commerce Corp., 58 
FED. RES. BULL. 674 (1972) (conflicts of interest). 
268. The Board has permitted bank holding companies to carry on activities that 
are expressly forbidden to banks. See, e.g., Bank of Va. Co., 58 Fm. REs. BULL. 934 
(1972) (mortgage company making second mortgages); Guaranty Loan &: Inv. Corp., 58 
Fm. RES. BULL. 738 (1972) (industrial bank making second mortgages). Generally banks 
are not allowed to make second mortgages. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 371 (1970), interpreted 
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does not consider the regulations to be all-inclusive. Second, peculiar 
circumstances may make given activity permissible under section 
4(c)(8) in one location or situation, but not in another. Similarly, 
an activity on the regulation's list will not be approved if public 
benefits do not outweigh potential harms.269 
The fact that an activity is declared to be "closely related" under 
the regulations does have one tangible effect. The Board has pro-
vided a simpler application procedure for de novo entry into activ-
ities that have been determined to be closely related to banking 
under the regulations than for acquisition of a going concern or 
de novo entry into activities not determined to be closely related.270 
Under the simplified procedure, the holding company is required 
to publish notice of its proposal in newspapers of general circulation 
in the communities to be served.271 Within thirty days the company 
must notify the Federal Reserve Bank for its district of the proposal; 
the activities may be commenced forty-five days later unless the 
company is notified to the contrary by the Bank.272 
When the entry is to be by acquisition of a going concem,273 
or if the entry is de novo but into an activity that has not been found 
to be closely related to banking under the regulations,274 notice must 
be filed with the Federal Reserve Bank and a copy of the notice 
by 12 C.F.R. § 7.2IO0(b)(3) (1973); CAL. FIN. CODE § 1227 (West 1968); MASS. GEN. LAws 
ANN. ch. 172, § 55 (1970). The Board has also permitted bank holding companies to 
engage in activities that would have been beyond the power of their bank subsidiary. 
See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 225.4{a)(9)-(IO) (1973) (insurance activities). National bank insurance 
activities are very limited. See Saxon v. Georgia Assn. of Indep. Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 
F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968); 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1970). 
269. See, e.g., First Tulsa Bancorporation, 58 FED. R.Es. BULL. 317 (1972); First Com-
mercial Banks, Inc., 58 FED. R.Es. BuLL. 118 (1973). 
270. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)•{b) (1973). 
271. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(b)(l) (1973). 
272. The Reserve Bank may direct that the company await specific approval or that 
the procedure used for acquisitions be followed if "adverse comments of a substantial 
nature" are received within thirty days of the published notice or if it othenvise ap• 
pears appropriate in a particular case. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(b){l) (1973). 
Even more simplified procedures have been adopted for several classes of activities 
for which the Board essentially established a presumption that such activities produce 
net public benefits. 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.4(b)(3)(i)(a), (ii) (1973) (small loan companies and 
certain de novo insurance activities). However, shortly after these procedures were an• 
nounced the Board suspended their operation until further notice, 58 FED. Rrs. BULL. 
149 (1972), and they have not been reinstated. 
The Board has proposed a revision of 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(b)(I) that would expressly 
state that there is a presumption that de novo entry into activities listed in 12 C.F.R. 
§ 225.4(a) (1973) (except general insurance agencies in locations with populations 
over 5,000) would produce public benefits. Proposed Reg. Y § 225.4(b)(l), 36 Fed. Reg. 
25048 (1971). However, the procedures required for such entries would not be changed. 
The proposal has not been put into effect, and the Board has given no indication that 
it will be. 
273. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(b)(2) (1973). 
274. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a) (1973) (requires same procedures as used for acquisitions). 
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published in the communities to be served. The Board then pub-
lishes notice of the application in the Federal Register, and interested 
persons are given an opportunity to express their views on the public 
benefits issue.276 These procedures, however, appear to be primarily 
designed to facilitate de novo entries. In that respect they follow the 
command of the statute: "In orders and regulations under this sub-
section, the Board may differentiate beween activities commenced 
de novo and activities commenced by the acquisition, in whole or 
in part, of a going concern,"276 and the intent expressed in the com-
mittee report: 
One of the asserted justifications for permitting bank holding com-
panies to engage in activities that the Board has determined inde-
pendently to be closely related to banking, is to permit the introduc-
tion of new innovative and competitive vigor into those markets 
which could benefit therefrom. Where a bank holding company en-
ters a market through acquisition of a major going concern, it may 
not have the incentive to compete vigorously, thereby bringing the 
possible benefits into play, as it would immediately succeed to what 
it might consider its fair share of the market.277 
The requirement that the proposed activities be deemed to be 
"closely related" under the regulations is merely a screening device 
to ensure that clear cases are not allowed to slip by. It should be 
noted that even the simplified procedures allow the Board to halt 
the entry if an analysis of the public benefits seems appropriate. 
The regulations, once again, are not the final word. 
Although the implementation of the 1970 amendments of the 
Bank Holding Company Act is not yet complete, the Federal Re-
serve Board has taken a progressive, if not radical, approach to 
the entry of bank affiliates into nonbank activities. The Board has 
refused to set forth definitive categories of activities that are or 
are not permissible. Rather, it has followed the mandate of the 
statute and looked to see if the specific entry in question will 
have any detrimental or beneficial effects. It is on this basis that a 
decision will be made on any given application. 
275. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(b)(2) (1973). The regulation allows the Board to hold hearings 
"where appropriate." Section 4(c)(8) of the Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1970), requires 
that determinations as to what activities are closely related to banking shall be made 
"after due notice and opportunity for hearing." 
Section 225.4(a) allows decisions on the "closely related" issue to be made using the 
procedures under section 225.4(b)(2). Since the latter regulation does not provide for 
the right of interested persons to be heard on the relatedness issue, it is arguably in-
compatible with the statute. However, it appears that under such circumstances the 
Board in fact permits interested parties to be heard on the relatedness issue. See Bank-
America Corp., 38 Fed. Reg. 4816 (1973). 
276. Bank Holding Company Act § 4(c)(8), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1970). 
277. House Managers' Statement, supra note 75, at 17. 
